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Preface 
This study was undertaken in the context of the research and advisory activi-
ties of the German Development Institute (DIE) relating to the reform of the 
development cooperation of the United Nations (UN). The Paris Declaration 
on Aid Effectiveness was adopted in March 2005 by government representa-
tives, multilateral organisations and non-governmental organisations. It 
commits the signatories – donors and partner countries – to increased owner-
ship, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results and mutual accountabil-
ity. The aim is to make aid more effective so as to improve the prospects of 
the Millennium Development Goals being achieved. Twelve indicators set 
targets for 2010 to enable progress in implementation to be tracked. 
The UN funds, programmes and specialised agencies – represented by the 
United Nations Development Group (UNDG) – have also signed the Paris 
Declaration. Their performance, too, must therefore be assessed against the 
commitments they have entered into. This study takes stock of the progress 
made by the UN development cooperation system in implementing the Paris 
Declaration and considers the strengths of UN development cooperation with 
a view to a more effective division of labour in international development 
cooperation for which the Paris Declaration calls. Furthermore, it analyses the 
report of the High-level Panel on System-wide Coherence in the light of the 
Paris Declaration. It thus contributes to the debate being conducted in the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and within the UN on pro-
gress to date in the implementation of the Paris Declaration and on the need 
for further reforms. 
The study is based on interviews with UN and DAC staff, many of whom 
made helpful documents available. I would like to take this opportunity to 
offer to all those interviewed or otherwise involved my sincere thanks for 
their cooperation and support. 
 
 
Bonn, February 2008  Martina Vatterodt 
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Summary 
1 Introduction 
In signing the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, donors and partner 
countries entered into commitments to making development cooperation 
more effective with a view to the achievement of the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals. The Paris Declaration defines five dimensions – ownership, 
alignment, harmonisation, managing for results and mutual accountability. 
Twelve indicators are to be used to gauge the degree to which these donor 
and partner country commitments are met by 2010. 
The Declaration was also signed by the United Nations development coop-
eration system (Funds, Programmes and Specialized Agencies1). This study 
analyses the progress made by the UN system in meeting the commitments 
set out in the Declaration. Similarly, the report of the High-level Panel on 
System-wide Coherence is examined in the light of the Paris Declaration. 
The study is based on interviews with staff members of the United Nations 
and of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and on an analysis of 
UN documents and OECD survey data on the implementation of the Paris 
Declaration. 
2 Implementation of the Paris Declaration by the United  
Nations development cooperation system 
The UN development cooperation system has adopted the dynamism intro-
duced into the international development cooperation system by the Paris 
Declaration, endorsed its objectives in (internal) statements and also played 
its part in this respect in international fora. An analysis of the implementation 
of the Declaration arrives at the following conclusion: 
                                                          
1  The World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund are excluded from this analysis 
because of their fundamentally different organisational structure. 
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Alignment 
The alignment dimension of the Paris Declaration records the extent to which 
development cooperation actors align their efforts with partner countries’ 
national development strategies and procedures. Indicator 3 measures the 
percentage of Official Development Assistance (ODA) intended for the pub-
lic sector that is reported on the partner country’s budget. The OECD Survey 
on Monitoring the Paris Declaration (OECD 2007) indicates only about 30 % 
in the case of the UN agencies (target: 85 %). A reason for this low figure is 
that the UN agencies are active in the field of technical cooperation, which is 
more difficult to report on a partner country’s budget than financial coopera-
tion. The UN agencies, too, see this as a problem. Awareness of this prob-
lem, however, is not yet particularly pronounced in many UN agencies. They 
therefore need to pay more attention to greater transparency of their own 
spending at country level. 
In contrast to this below-average resulting from the OECD-monitoring, the 
Multilateral Organizations Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) 
rates the efforts of some UN agencies very highly. Furthermore, the UN 
agencies gear their work to partner countries’ priorities through the United 
Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF).  
Indicator 4 measures the extent to which donors harmonise capacity devel-
opment with other donors under coordinated programmes. According to the 
OECD Survey (OECD 2007), 44 % of the UN agencies’ capacity develop-
ment is provided through coordinated programmes (target: 50 %). Many UN 
agencies are now working on ways of helping partner countries to design and 
implement their own development plans. Yet many UN officials still lack the 
expertise needed to assist partner countries with this work. 
Indicators 5a and 5b measure the degree to which donors use country pro-
curement, financial management and evaluation systems for their operational 
activities. The OECD Survey shows that the UN agencies currently make 
little use of country systems. This is also confirmed by the UN.  
Indicator 6 of the Paris Declaration measures the number of parallel project 
implementation units (PIU) in each country. According to the OECD Survey, 
the UN agencies maintain a comparatively large number of PIUs (OECD 
2007). However, as the OECD combines under the collective term “United 
Nations” the PIUs of several UN agencies, the survey produces a compara-
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tively higher absolute number for the UN agencies. Nonetheless, UN staff 
members confirm that the UN agencies still have room for improvement in 
this sphere. 
Indicator 7 covers the proportion of ODA payments made to partner coun-
tries in accordance with an agreed (multi-year) schedule. The donors’ alloca-
tion practices are such that many UN agencies undertake their operational 
activities largely on the basis of one-year commitments. Furthermore, funds 
are increasingly earmarked. This makes it difficult to plan the UN agencies’ 
activities. The OECD Survey confirms that the United Nations’ operational 
activities are not very predictable. 
Harmonisation 
Indicator 9 identifies the percentage of ODA provided by donors in the con-
text of programme-based approaches (sector programme, budget support). 
The UN agencies’ internal rules permit them to participate (financially) in 
pooled funding and sector programmes. The UN agencies do not, however, 
have extensive financial resources that they can provide for these aid modali-
ties.  
According to UNDG, it is not financial contributions that determine the UN 
agencies’ participation in a sector programme but rather the expertise they 
contribute to the planning and implementation of such programmes. In the 
case of budget support and pooled funding, the UN agencies are called upon 
to assist partner countries with the implementation of these aid modalities. It 
has yet to be clarified, however, whether they indeed have the expertise they 
claim to have in this sphere.  
Increased participation by the UN agencies in programme-based approaches 
is obstructed by the fact that the agencies are still often bound by the classi-
cal project approach. 
The OECD Survey (OECD 2007) reveals that the UN agencies provide only 
39 % of their aid in the context of programme-based approaches (target: 
66 %). The Multilateral Organizations Performance Assessment Network 
(MOPAN) rates UNDP and UNFPA as generally doing too little to harmo-
nise with other donors.  
The OECD Survey (OECD 2007) reveals that the UN agencies conduct 30 % 
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of their missions jointly (target: 40 %) and that the absolute number of mis-
sions is high (2,876) (Indicator 10). UN staff members confirm that the high 
number of missions and the small proportion of missions conducted jointly is 
a problem.  
The UN agencies carry out 63 % of their country analyses jointly (target: 
66 %) (OECD 2007). With the Common Country Assessment (CCA) the UN 
agencies conduct a joint UN country analysis and thereby promote intra-UN 
harmonisation. 
Since the late 1990s the UN agencies have undertaken numerous reforms, 
which have advanced intra-UN harmonisation. The UN Development Group 
describes this internal harmonisation agenda as “intra-UN implementation of 
the Paris Declaration” (UNDG 2007b, 34). However, the Paris-Declaration 
claims for external reforms. Accordingly, the UN development cooperation 
system has to go beyond these activities and become more closely involved 
in harmonisation with other development cooperation actors. 
Managing for results 
Managing for results means donors planning their development cooperation 
in a way that the progress made by their measures can be assessed against 
predetermined results. There are no empirical data on the extent to which the 
UN agencies manage for results. Indications that they use managing-for-
results instruments are the United Nations Development Assistance Frame-
work (UNDAF) and the use of computer-based planning tools, such as AT-
LAS.  
Mutual accountability 
By acknowledging the Paris-Declaration the UN agencies committed them-
selves to provide partner governments with up-to-date and transparent infor-
mation on their development cooperation efforts. The UN agencies report to 
partner governments on the allocation of funds from their core resources. 
However, it is more difficult to provide partner countries with systematic and 
transparent information on the allocation of non-core resources. There are no 
empirical data on the extent to which the various UN agencies participate in 
mechanisms and processes for mutual accountability in partner countries. 
The Implementation of the Paris Declaration  
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Summary appraisal 
An analysis of the implementation of the Paris Declaration within the UN 
development cooperation system reveals that the latter has adopted the dy-
namism introduced by the Paris Declaration into the international develop-
ment cooperation system. Numerous reforms have advanced intra-UN har-
monisation since the late 1990s. Besides this, however, the UN agencies 
must become more closely involved in harmonisation with other donors.  
Furthermore, regarding the alignment dimension further efforts of the UN 
agencies are needed to fulfil their Paris Declaration-commitments. This in-
cludes more transparency towards the partner countries with regard to re-
source allocation at country level, an increased use of national systems and a 
reduction of parallel project implementation units. 
There are no systematic data available for the UN agencies with regard to the 
results-based management and mutual accountability dimensions. It is 
strongly recommended that the UN agencies deal with this matter. 
Further reforms within the UN development cooperation system are needed, 
such as that of the internal incentive systems and UN staff training geared to 
policy advice/policy dialogue/capacity development, in order to encourage 
and enable staff members to adhere to the Paris Declaration commitments. 
3 Analysis and appraisal of the report of the High-level Panel 
in the light of the Paris Declaration 
The report of the High-level Panel on System-wide Coherence proposes 
reforms that may encourage further harmonisation within the UN develop-
ment cooperation system. Particular emphasis should be placed on the rec-
ommendation for One UN (= one programme, one budgetary framework, one 
leader, one office), which would make the UN agencies’ operational work at 
country level more coherent. This approach has been put to the test since 
early 2007 in eight pilot countries (Vietnam, Pakistan, Mozambique, Tanza-
nia, Cape Verde, Uruguay, Albania and Rwanda).  
Intra-UN harmonisation at country level can also be improved if, as proposed 
by the Panel, the position of the Resident Coordinator is strengthened. The 
proposal for the amalgamation of the governance structures of UNDP/UNFPA, 
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UNICEF and WFP may lead to more coherent programme planning. The 
Panel’s reform proposals will not, however, do anything to help the UN 
development cooperation system to meet the commitments arising from the 
Paris Declaration, since they are geared solely to internal reforms. In order to 
meet their commitments the UN agencies have to go beyond this internal 
reform level. 
4 Implications for the positioning of the UN agencies in the 
international development cooperation system 
The analysis of progress in the implementation of the Paris Declaration raises 
the question as to which of their strengths the UN agencies can use to meet 
the commitments arising for them from the Paris Declaration and what posi-
tion – based on their strengths – they intend to occupy in the international 
development cooperation system in the future. 
Although not yet empirically confirmed in every case, strengths are ascribed 
to the UN agencies in the following spheres: the setting of international 
norms and standards, operational activities in politically sensitive areas, the 
formulation of an alternative voice in the development field, closeness to 
the developing countries, global local representation, capacity-building/ 
government advice and advocacy for development goals. 
The UN agencies could use their strength in capacity-building to further the 
implementation of the Paris Declaration.2 The global representation of many 
UN agencies – especially in countries where bilateral actors are not present – 
and their closeness to developing countries might also be used for greater 
alignment and capacity-building. The UN agencies’ advocacy role might 
support the formulation and implementation of national development strate-
gies. The developing countries and the UNDG itself refer to assisting devel-
oping countries with aid coordination as a further task for the UN agencies in 
the implementation of the Paris Declaration. 
The strengths of the UN agencies have yet to be used in the implementation 
of the Paris Declaration, which would in any case be only a first step. Of 
                                                          
2  Although the UN agencies often refer to this strength, it has not yet been empirically confirmed. 
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greater import will be the decision yet to be taken on the eventual position of 
the UN agencies in the international development cooperation system – 
based on their strengths. The Paris Declaration explicitly calls for such a 
positioning and division of labour between the development cooperation 
actors – based on their strengths (Paris Declaration 2005, 6, paragraph 35).  
The realignment and positioning of the UN development cooperation system 
has already been considered in various theoretical models. Messner et al. 
(2005), for example, propose that the position of the UN development coop-
eration system should be upgraded and installed as the leading actor in the 
development sphere. Other models envisage a consolidated UN development 
cooperation unit (BMZ 2006; Kloke-Lesch et al. 2006; OECD/DAC 2005b). 
However, these reform models merely propose a consolidation of the UN 
institutional landscape and do not consider the role of the UN agencies in the 
international development cooperation system.  
The use of sector programmes and budget support similarly requires that the 
UN agencies occupy a position according to the contribution they have to 
make. In these areas government advice and capacity-building, for example, 
are the only opportunities for the UN agencies to play a part, since their 
financial resources are limited. It has yet to be determined, however, whether 
(certain) UN agencies have particular expertise in this respect. 
The question whether the UN agencies have strengths in certain areas of 
operational activities remains unanswered. Whether they should withdraw 
from operational areas in which they may not demonstrate any strength is 
similarly still an open question.  
The position of the UN agencies can be determined only if clear mandates 
are issued and serious structural problems are overcome. For this, however, 
decisions need to be taken by the member countries. But the intergovernmen-
tal negotiations on the reform of UN development cooperation are currently 
very difficult because of the confrontation between the industrialised coun-
tries and the G77. If these decision-making processes are so difficult, it has 
to be asked at this juncture how capable the UN agencies are of being re-
formed if the thinking that underlies power politics prevents reforms from 
being undertaken. 
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5 Taking stock and recommendations for the position to be 
taken by the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (BMZ) 
The BMZ can help the UN development cooperation system to implement 
the Paris Declaration through the Executive Boards, through its own conduct 
as a donor and by providing pump-priming finance for certain reforms. 
Through the Executive Boards reference can be made to all the weaknesses 
of the UN agencies in the implementation of the Paris Declaration.3 Priority 
should be given to a systematic monitoring of progress by the UN agencies, a 
harmonisation with other donors and the position of the UN development 
cooperation system within the international development cooperation system. 
The BMZ should also call for further harmonisation of business practices and 
a reform of the UN agencies’ internal incentive systems. 
The BMZ should coordinate its own conduct as a donor even more closely 
with other German government departments. The German government’s 
conduct towards the UN agencies as a donor should change to allow for 
multi-year commitments. Furthermore, contributions should be paid primar-
ily into the UN agencies’ core budgets. The German government – together 
with other countries – should also press in the governing boards for the 
commitments arising from the Paris Declaration to be met. 
The BMZ can also prompt the implementation of innovative reforms with 
pump-priming finance and so create positive reform momentum. When pro-
viding such resources, the BMZ should point out that successful reform ini-
tiatives must be self-sustaining in the medium to long term by being financed 
from core resources.  
During the intergovernmental negotiations the BMZ should back the High-
level Panel’s idea of One UN. The German government should enter into a 
dialogue with developing countries interested in reforms and establish a 
reform-friendly North-South alliance. Going beyond the UN-internal har-
monisation, the BMZ should advocate for more extensive harmonisation of 
                                                          
3  The BMZ is able to speak only at meetings of Executive Boards for which it is the responsible 
ministry (UNDP/UNIFEM, UNIDO, WFP, UNFPA). 
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the UN agencies with other donors. This is important if the UN development 
cooperation system is not to be inhibited and eventually marginalised as a 
result of an excessive inward focus. 
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1 Introduction 
In March 2005 donors, developing countries and non-governmental organisa-
tions agreed on commitments to more effective development cooperation at 
country level (Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 2005). The aim of the 
Declaration is to increase the effectiveness of development cooperation by 
means of commitments by both partners and donors and so to improve the 
prospects of the Millennium Development Goals being achieved. Success in 
meeting the commitments is to be measured with the help of 12 progress 
indicators. The United Nations (UN) has similarly signed the Paris Declara-
tion. This study analyses and appraises the degree to which these commit-
ments are being met within the UN development cooperation system.  
Part 2 gives an overview of the contents of the Paris Declaration (Chapter 
2.1) and explains the UN development cooperation system (Chapter 2.2). 
Chapter 2.3 describes how the UN development cooperation system has re-
sponded to the Paris Declaration, of greatest importance in this context being 
the Action Plan of the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) for the 
implementation of the Paris Declaration. Chapter 2.4 applies the dimensions 
of the Paris Declaration and its progress indicators to the UN development 
cooperation system, while Chapter 2.5 summarises and appraises the progress 
made by the UN development cooperation system in implementing the Paris 
Declaration.  
Chapter 3 considers the current trend in the UN reform process and analyses 
the report of the High-level Panel on UN system-wide Coherence against the 
background of the targets set by the Paris Declaration. The analysis of pro-
gress made in implementing the Declaration and the current reform process 
raise the question as to what implications the division of labour among the 
development cooperation actors, for which the Paris Declaration calls, will 
have for the position of the UN agencies in the international development 
cooperation system. Any positioning undertaken and any clear line drawn 
between the UN agencies and the other development cooperation actors 
should be based on their respective strengths. Chapter 4.1 therefore begins by 
discussing the strengths of the UN agencies in development cooperation. 
Building on this, Chapter 4.2 considers the future role of the UN agencies in 
the international development cooperation system. 
To conclude, Chapter 5 sets out recommendations for determining the posi-
tion of the BMZ on the basis of identified weaknesses in the implementation 
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of the Paris Declaration and with a view to the intergovernmental negotia-
tions on the report of the High-level Panel. 
The information on the UN agencies’ implementation of the Paris Declaration 
is based on an analysis of UN documents, on interviews with UN and 
OECD/DAC staff and on the OECD Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declara-
tion (OECD 2007). Boxes at the end of some sections serve to illustrate the 
areas analysed by providing examples. 
2 Implementation of the Paris Declaration by the 
United Nations development cooperation system: 
analysis and appraisal 
2.1 The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
The agreement between donors and partner countries on how development 
cooperation can be made more effective was formulated in the Paris Declara-
tion on Aid Effectiveness (referred to in the following as “the Paris Declara-
tion”; see Annex) in March 2005 at a forum of donors and partner countries. 
Effective development cooperation is to attain, with the resources used, the 
greatest possible degree of measurable success in the achievement of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in developing countries. The Paris 
Declaration defines five dimensions for a more effective form of develop-
ment cooperation: ownership, harmonisation, alignment, managing for results 
and mutual accountability.4 The five dimensions entail practical commitments 
for donors and partner countries. The extent to which these commitments are 
met by 2010 is to be measured with the help of twelve indicators. 
The Paris Declaration thus sets out a new understanding of how development 
cooperation should be organised: it is to be harmonised among the donors and 
geared to national priorities, and it is to strengthen the partner countries’ 
capacity to undertake and manage development activities on their own. In this 
context, budget support and other programme-based approaches are impor-
                                                          
4  For a critical analysis of the dimensions and progress indicators of the Paris Declaration see 
Fedon (2006) and Rogerson (2005). 
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tant aid modalities.5 Greater use is to be made of country procurement and 
financial management systems in development cooperation activities. 
In the meantime, more than a hundred states, international development or-
ganisations and non-governmental organisations have signed the Paris Decla-
ration and committed themselves to achieving the goals it defines. UN funds, 
programmes and specialised agencies – represented by the United Nations 
Development Group (UNDG) – have also signed the Paris Declaration and so 
committed themselves to implementing it. 
If the implementation of the Paris Declaration by the UN development coop-
eration system is to be suitably appraised and analysed, the structure of the 
system needs to be understood. The following therefore explains which UN 
agencies can be included in the term “UN development cooperation system” 
and how they relate to one another. 
2.2 The United Nations Development Cooperation System 
In the following the term “UN development cooperation system” embraces 
all the UN funds, programmes and specialised agencies operationally active 
in development cooperation, with the exception of the World Bank Group 
and the IMF.6 Because of their structure, the World Bank Group and the IMF 
                                                          
5  Programme-based approaches (PBAs) include donor contributions to partners’ programmes 
and strategies in the form of basket financing and general budget support. In basket financ-
ing and other forms of pooled funding two or more donors provide resources for the financ-
ing of a project or programme. The various donor contributions must not be earmarked for 
specific measures. The partner (government) is responsible for the implementation of the 
project/programme (see BMZ 2001, 4). Budget support is a form of direct financing of a 
country’s overall or sectoral budget through the payment of donor contributions into its 
budget. The partner country is responsible for the use of the funds (ibid.). 
 In addition, sector programmes are regarded as sector-wide approaches (SWAps). SWAps 
always concern a certain sector or thematic area (e.g. health and education), the donors 
pooling their contributions for the sphere concerned. Administration and monitoring of do-
nor resources are the partners’ responsibility. The basic idea behind programme-based ap-
proaches is closer alignment with partners’ priorities and their acceptance of greater owner-
ship (BMZ 2001; Klingebiel et al. 2007; Leiderer 2004). 
6  The UN funds and UN programmes mandated to perform the operational work in develop-
ment cooperation are UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), UNFPA (United 
Nations Population Fund), UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund) and WFP (World 
Food Programme). UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme) also operates in some 
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work under fundamentally different conditions from the other specialised 
agencies and the funds and programmes, which is why they are excluded 
from this analysis. 
The distinction between UN funds and programmes and UN specialised 
agencies is very important. The funds and programmes report directly to the 
General Assembly. The specialised agencies are linked to the UN only by 
treaty and are subject to no instructions of the General Assembly. 
The specialised agencies have their own memberships and their own supervi-
sory structures and collect compulsory assessed contributions from their 
members. They are not obliged to cooperate with the funds and programmes. 
In line with the mandate they have received from their members, the special-
ised agencies have the task of setting international norms and standards. In 
this original division of labour the World Bank was entrusted with the task of 
providing the developing countries with loans on favourable terms to finance 
investments. 
Some of the specialised agencies have extended their areas of responsibility 
considerably over the years – a development known as “mission creep“ – 
with the result that today they are also operationally active in development 
cooperation, to a significant degree in some cases. For this operational work 
they canvass their members for voluntary contributions, in addition to the 
compulsory assessed contributions they receive. 
Contributions from the industrialised, newly industrialising and developing 
countries to the UN funds, programmes and specialised agencies (excluding 
the Bretton Woods Institutions) amounted to 12.27 billion US$ in 2004 
(United Nations General Assembly 2006, 6f.). However, this (rather large) 
sum also includes contributions for humanitarian assistance.  
The funds and programmes report to the General Assembly on their work and 
are subject to its instructions. Executive boards with members drawn from a 
regionally representative selection of member states are responsible for con-
                                                          
developing countries. For an overview of the UN development cooperation system see 
Fues / Klingebiel (2007, 222ff.). The World Bank Group, WHO (World Health Organiza-
tion), FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization), ILO (International Labour Organization), 
IFAD (International Fund for Agricultural Development), UNIDO (United Nations Indus-
trial Development Organization) und UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization) are also operationally active in development cooperation. 
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trolling and supervising the work of the funds and programmes. The funds 
and programmes are financed entirely from voluntary contributions from the 
UN member countries, comprising contributions to their core resources and 
non-core resources.7 The ratio of core to non-core resources has steadily 
shifted in the past in favour of non-core resources. This increased earmarking 
of resources has given rise to creeping “bilateralisation” of UN development 
cooperation, since the donors set their own priorities for the work of the UN 
agencies without consulting the Executive Boards. 
On the initiative of the then UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, the United 
Nations Development Group (UNDG) was established in 1997 as the um-
brella for the funds, programmes and specialised agencies active in develop-
ment cooperation. The UNDG is a coordination unit consisting of representa-
tives of 25 UN agencies whose normative and/or operational work is con-
cerned with development issues. The aim is to harmonise the many different 
instruments and processes within the UN development cooperation system 
and to coordinate operational work more closely. 
The UNDG’s decisions are binding only on the agencies that report directly 
to the UN Secretary-General and the General Assembly: UNDP, UNICEF, 
UNFPA and WFP. These four funds and programmes are represented on the 
UNDG Executive Committee (ExCom agencies). Decisions taken by the 
UNDG Executive Committee must be implemented by the ExCom agencies. 
Such decisions are not binding on the UN’s specialised agencies. 
UNDG is supported substantively by the UNDG Office (DGO). DGO is 
working on the standardisation of instruments and work processes. It also 
assists the UN Country Teams (UNCTs) and the Resident Coordinators (RCs) 
with the harmonisation of working methods and joint programme planning. 
The UNCT is the UNDG’s counterpart at country level. It consists of repre-
sentatives of all the UN agencies operating in a country. The aim is to 
achieve closer coordination of operational activities through the UNCT. The 
RC is the chairman of the UNCT. It is his task to coordinate the activities of 
                                                          
7  The funds and programmes are free to choose how core resources are used, subject to their 
strategic work plans and regional allocation scale. Core resources are thus based on the idea 
behind multilateral development cooperation: The allocation of resources is guided by the 
mandate agreed among the UN member countries, none of which may exercise undue in-
fluence. When non-core resources are allocated, the donors define (unilaterally) the pur-
poses for which they are to be used. 
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the UN agencies in a country. In most countries the RC is also UNDP’s Resi-
dent Representative and is financed by UNDP. 
The following describes how the UN development cooperation system has 
received the Paris Declaration since this forms the basis on which the com-
mitments are to be met in practice. 
2.3 Reception given to the Paris Declaration in the UN 
development cooperation system 
The United Nations Development Group (UNDG) signed the Paris Declara-
tion in March 2005 on behalf of the UN development cooperation system and 
officially declared its willingness to implement the declaration (Obaid 2005a; 
2005b; UNDG 2005e).8 In a circular letter sent to all Resident Coordinators 
in April 2005 the UNDG Chairman describes the importance of the Paris 
Declaration for the UN development cooperation system (UNDG 2005h). 
According to this letter, UNDG sees the strength of the UN development 
cooperation system as lying in capacity development, this in turn enabling it 
to contribute to the implementation of the Paris Declaration at country level 
(ibid.).9 In July 2005 UNDG published an action plan for the implementation 
of the Paris Declaration,10 which identifies three key areas for its implementa-
tion by the UN development cooperation system (see UNDG 2005b; 2005f): 
1. Putting national development plans at the centre of UN country pro-
gramming 
The instruments referred to in this context include Common Country As-
sessments (CCAs), assisting with the preparation of national Poverty Reduc-
tion Strategy Papers (PRSPs), synchronising programme planning with  
                                                          
8  Official statements on aspects of harmonisation and the role of the UN development coop-
eration system had been published long before the adoption of the Paris Declaration; see 
UNDG 2003e. 
9  For a discussion of the strengths of the UN development cooperation system see Chapter 
4.1. 
10  In response to the High-level Forum in Rome and the Rome Declaration on Harmonisation 
UNDG had described the UN development cooperation system’s role in harmonisation and 
alignment with partners as early as 2003 (UNDG 2003b; UNDG 2003c). 
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national planning processes and aligning the UN agencies’ analytical work 
with national analytical work.11 
2. Strengthening national capacities 
The UN agencies are to help partner governments to use new financing in-
struments and budget support and to carry out their own monitoring of the 
Paris Declaration. 
3. Increasingly using and strengthening country systems 
The country procurement, monitoring, evaluation and financial systems are to 
be strengthened and used. 
The UNDG Action Plan also contains a detailed list of the activities planned 
by UNDG to achieve the objectives in the three focal areas referred to above. 
The Action Plan assigns the Paris Declaration to the two strengths of UN 
development cooperation proclaimed by UNDG, “capacity development” and 
“policy advice.” The two dimensions “managing for results” and “mutual 
accountability” in the Paris Declaration are not singled out for discussion in 
the Action Plan. 
In general, it is not clear from the Action Plan what particularly qualifies the 
UN agencies for the tasks described or what role the UN agencies see for 
themselves in the three areas referred to, especially in the interplay with other 
donors. Most of the planned activities are not precisely defined, which makes 
monitoring of progress towards the goals difficult. In summary, it can be said 
that the UNDG Action Plan is not an instrument that the UN agencies can use 
for strategic positioning in the implementation of the Paris Declaration. 
The Action Plan and thus the achievement of the goals set are binding on the 
ExCom agencies UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF and WFP. In response to the 
adoption of the Paris Declaration the management levels of many UN agen-
cies have issued internal communiqués (for UNDP see DAC Working Party 
on Aid Effectiveness 2006) and set up working groups to consider aid effec-
tiveness questions. UN agencies were represented at the regional workshops 
on the Paris Declaration held in Uganda, Mali, South Africa, Bolivia and the 
                                                          
11  These instruments are considered further in Chapter 2.4 in the context of the specific re-
forms being undertaken to implement the Paris Declaration in the UN development coop-
eration system. 
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Philippines in 2005/2006 and even financed some of them (see DAC 2006b; 
2006c). 
The UN development cooperation system has thus recognised the dynamism 
sparked by the Paris Declaration within the international development coop-
eration system and participates in international fora on the Paris Declaration. 
Representatives of the OECD/DAC similarly see the UN agencies as suppor-
tive and seriously interested in the reform processes. Box 2.1 describes the 
reception given to the Paris Declaration within the UN agencies, taking UN-
FPA as its example.  
 
Box 2. 1: Reception given to the Paris Declaration within the UN agencies, 
taking UNFPA as an example 
UNFPA’s Executive Director, Thoraya Obaid, has endorsed the commitments con-
tained in the Paris Declaration both internally and externally at UNFPA Executive 
Board meetings. Among other things, she emphasises UNFPA’s strength in the 
development of country capacities and the efforts it makes to use country systems. 
UNFPA has drawn up internal guides on aspects of aid effectiveness for its staff. 
Within UNFPA an interdivisional working group is considering aid effectiveness 
issues and is in contact with the country offices. An internal virtual communication 
platform has been set up to encourage exchanges among staff members in the field. 
UNFPA has organised a number of workshops and training courses for its field staff 
on aspects of aid effectiveness. However, only one staff member at headquarters is 
able to devote all her time to aid effectiveness. Similar staffing constraints are evi-
dent in other UN agencies. 
Sources: Obaid 2007; 2006a; 2006b; 2005b; 2005c, interviews with UN staff. 
The following analyses how the UN development cooperation system is 
meeting the commitments set out in the Paris Declaration by posing two 
questions. First, to what extent has the UN development cooperation system 
already incorporated the dimensions of the Paris Declaration in its operational 
work and what progress has it made regarding the agreed target indicators? 
Second, how can the reform measures prompted by the then UN Secretary-
General, Kofi Annan, in 199712 be assigned to the dimensions of the Paris 
                                                          
12  For an overview of the reform measures initiated by Kofi Annan in the period 1997-2003 
see Gillinson 2003. 
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Declaration and its indicators?13 This assignment will help to determine how 
compatible those reforms are with the requirements of the Paris Declaration 
and whether they may help UN agencies to meet the commitments defined by 
the Paris Declaration. This analysis is undertaken in sections 2.4.1 to 2.4.4 
and is based on an analysis of UN documents, interviews with UN staff and 
the data contained in the OECD Survey (OECD 2007). 
The last of these sources is a survey conducted by the OECD of the progress 
being made by 34 countries and 55 bilateral donors and multilateral organisa-
tions, all participating voluntarily, in the implementation of the Paris Declara-
tion at country level in respect of the targets set for 2010.14 The findings of 
the OECD Survey on the UN agencies must, however, be viewed with cau-
tion, since the definition of what the term “United Nations” includes varies 
among the 34 countries surveyed. The Survey, on the other hand, presents an 
aggregate figure for the whole “UN”. Accordingly, it is impossible to deter-
mine which UN agencies the term “UN” includes. 
The fact that the Survey summarises data on a number of UN agencies must 
also be borne in mind when absolute figures of the survey are considered. It 
is therefore not surprising that the absolute numbers of missions and country 
analyses counted under the collective term “UN” are far higher than those for 
individual bilateral donors. 
In an initial appraisal of the implementation of the Paris Declaration in 2006 
(DAC 2006a) the OECD/DAC made a number of general comments on the 
subject, which have been confirmed by UN representatives as also applying 
to the UN agencies. They claimed that – even within the UN agencies – many 
donors take the view that the Paris Declaration is still largely a product and 
agenda of those who lay down the guidelines and principles of policy at 
headquarters. For those engaged in designing development programmes, on 
the other hand, the Paris Declaration seems to be less of a priority (ibid.). 
Within the UN development agencies – as well as within bilateral donors and 
other multilateral organisations – there still exist guidelines and rules that 
                                                          
13  Many of these reforms are assigned to the harmonisation dimension (see Chapter 2.4.2) of 
the Paris Declaration. 
14  An initial comprehensive examination of activities and progress at country level in the 
areas of harmonisation, alignment and managing for results was made by the DAC in 
preparation for the High-level Forum held in Paris in March 2005, at which the Paris Decla-
ration was adopted (DAC 2005). 
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prevent closer cooperation at country level or are perceived by staff at coun-
try level as an obstacle (ibid.). In the case of the UN development coopera-
tion system there are, for example, inadequately harmonised business prac-
tices or requirements laid down by the various Executive Boards, making 
separate reporting compulsory.15  
UNDG circulated a questionnaire to the UNCTs that was designed to sup-
plement the questions put by the OECD Survey (2007) with the aim of cover-
ing the UN-specific aspects of the implementation of the Paris Declaration. 
The questionnaire was sent to some 130 UNCTs. By the end of 2006 eleven 
replies had been received. The findings were evaluated for internal purposes 
only. As UNDG has no authority over the UNCTs, it has to rely on them to 
cooperate voluntarily. The lack of systematic feedback from country level to 
headquarters makes monitoring difficult. Despite this, UNDG – with the 
resources at its disposal – is at pains to monitor activities. Progress in the 
achievement of the goals defined in the UNDG Action Plan described above 
is not measured by UNDG. 
UNDP, UNFPA and UNICEF do not themselves monitor progress in the 
implementation of the Paris Declaration, but rely on UNDG. As, however, 
UNDG receives no more than limited feedback from the UNCTs because of 
its lack of authority over them and as the replies permit no more than partial 
conclusions to be drawn from the answers given by individual agencies, the 
UN agencies do not have reliable information on the progress they are them-
selves making. But if staff at country level are to be offered practical advice 
by headquarters and if attempts are to be made to eliminate obstructive guide-
lines and rules, such information is essential. Systematic monitoring is there-
fore to be recommended so that weaknesses in implementation can be identi-
fied and appropriate advice offered.16 
On the basis of the OECD Survey (OECD 2007) discussed above, of UN 
documents and of statements by UN staff, the following considers how the 
UN development cooperation system has so far incorporated the dimensions 
                                                          
15  This is considered again in depth when the implementation of Indicator 9 is analysed (see 
pp. 29ff.) 
16  Unlike the UN funds and programmes, the World Bank monitors its progress in meeting the 
commitments arising from the Paris Declaration (see World Bank 2006). 
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of the Paris Declaration and Indicators 3, 4, 5a, 5b, 6, 7, 9 and 10.17 Indicator 
8, concerning the untying of aid, is excluded from this analysis, since the UN 
agencies provide all their aid untied.18 In addition, reforms within the UN 
development cooperation system are assigned to the commitments contained 
in the Paris Declaration to permit statements on their congruence with the 
Declaration. 
2.4 The dimensions of the Paris Declaration and their 
incorporation in the UN development cooperation 
system 
2.4.1 Alignment 
In the “alignment” dimension of the Paris Declaration donors undertake to 
align their development cooperation with country development strategies, 
institutions and procedures. Measures to reform the UN development coop-
eration system and specific steps taken by the UN agencies to implement the 
Paris Declaration are assigned in the following to Indicators 3, 4, 5a, 5b, 6 
and 7 of this dimension.  
Indicator 3 – Alignment with national development strategies 
Donors undertake to align their development cooperation with national de-
velopment strategies, such as PRSPs. This is also emphasised in the UNDG 
Action Plan (UNDG 2005b). Indicator 3 gauges progress in this area from the 
percentage of ODA intended for the government sector that is reported on the 
partner country’s budget and sets the target for 2010 at 85 %. Within the UN 
development cooperation system there is no monitoring to determine what 
proportion of aid from UN agencies is reported on partner countries’ budgets 
or how far the UN agencies align themselves with the partner countries’ pri-
orities. 
The OECD’s monitoring of progress puts the proportion of UN resources 
reported on the partner countries’ budgets at about 30 % (OECD 2007, 119). 
Compared to the other donors and multilateral organisations covered by the 
                                                          
17  Indicators 1, 2, 11 and 12 measure progress made by partner countries in meeting their 
commitments. 
18  The OECD Survey does not apply Indicator 8 to the UN either (OECD 2007, 119). 
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OECD Survey, the UN agencies bring up the rear with this result and are still 
far from achieving the 85 % target. However, only five of all donors have so 
far achieved the target (OECD 2007, 20).  
One reason for the UN agencies’ below-average showing in the case of this 
indicator is that they are active in the field of technical cooperation, which is 
more difficult to report on budget than financial cooperation. The UN agen-
cies, too, see this as a challenge (UNDG 2007b, 30). Awareness of this prob-
lem, however, is not yet particularly pronounced in many UN agencies. They 
therefore need to pay more attention internally to the call for greater transpar-
ency of their own spending at country level. Mechanisms for transparent 
reporting to partner countries have yet to be introduced in some cases. 
In general, the UN agencies are required to align their operational activities in 
partner countries with national priorities by means of the United Nations 
Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and the individual country 
programmes negotiated with national governments.19 The UNDAF defines 
the main aspects of UN development cooperation in a country, guided by the 
partner countries’ national development priorities. It is prepared every three 
to five years by the UNCT in cooperation with the partner government. 
All the various UN agencies’ country programmes are to be coordinated with 
the partner governments and to be based on national priorities. Thus the UN-
DAF is a UN instrument for alignment. In surveys of the UNCTs conducted 
by UNDG it has been found that the UN agencies have generally made con-
siderable progress in alignment with national priorities (UNDG 2007b, 30). 
The Multilateral Organizations Performance Assessment Network (MO-
PAN),20 for example, rates UNDP’s alignment with national development 
strategies and its support for national planning processes, such as the devel-
opment of a national poverty reduction strategy, very highly (MOPAN 2005a, 
8). UNFPA’s alignment with national priorities, especially in the health sec-
tor (sector programmes), is also deemed to be good, but despite this, it is 
                                                          
19  The weaknesses of the UNDAF are discussed further in Chapter 4.2 (harmonisation), since 
it is the most important instrument for improving coordination among the UN agencies at 
country level. 
20  MOPAN is a network of eight major (UN) donors who appraise the performance of indi-
vidual multilateral organisations in eight to ten countries. It conducts surveys of the opin-
ions of representatives of the participating donors at the embassies and/or country offices. 
The appraisal thus reflects only subjective assessments by the staff surveyed. 
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accused of often continuing to focus very much on its own projects and pro-
cedures (MOPAN 2005b, 22).  
To summarise, it can be said that, although the UN development cooperation 
system has its own alignment instruments and the UN agencies, too, achieve 
good results in this field, the OECD Survey indicates that the UN agencies 
still have some catching up to do as regards the reporting of their ODA in 
partner countries’ budgets, the greater difficulty of reporting technical coop-
eration notwithstanding. 
Indicator 4 – Capacity development through harmonised country  
programmes 
Indicator 4 of the Paris Declaration records the extent to which donors sup-
port capacity development through coordinated programmes, i.e. programmes 
harmonised with other donors. Capacity development is a further focal area 
not only of the UNDG Action Plan for the implementation of the Paris Decla-
ration (UNDG 2005b) but also of the work of the UN development coopera-
tion system. Within this system, however, there is no systematic monitoring 
of this aspect, either. 
According to the OECD Survey, 44 % of capacity development by the UN 
agencies is accomplished through coordinated programmes (OECD 2007, 
119). Even when compared with the findings on the other donors and interna-
tional organisations covered by the OECD Survey, this is a good result (aver-
age: 42 %). The target of 50 % by 2010 is thus almost achieved.  
The UN funds and programmes mostly use the term “capacity development” 
or “capacity-building” to describe the work they do. Capacity development is 
meant to be the most important element of the work of the UNCTs at country 
level (UNDG 2007b, 26). While capacity development by the UN develop-
ment cooperation system has in the past usually concentrated on developing 
partners’ capacity to implement UN projects, many UNCTs now focus on 
helping partner countries to devise and implement their own development 
plans. In 2005 40 UNCTs reported having been involved in the development 
of country capacities in the areas of “statistics and monitoring,” “planning 
and budget” and “human rights and gender issues” (UNDG 2006a).21 
                                                          
21  This figure is equivalent to about one third of all UNCTs in the world, but can be regarded 
as no more than an approximate figure for all UN activities in this sphere, since the total of 
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The UN development cooperation system also assists partner countries with 
the elaboration and monitoring of their own development strategies, using 
DevInfo, an instrument developed by UNDG (UNDG 2007b). DevInfo has 
been in use since 2004 and enables national governments to collect data relat-
ing to the achievement of the MDGs and, on that basis, to implement national 
decisions and development plans (see UNDG 2005a). In 2005 DevInfo was 
used by 60 partner countries for their planning processes (UNDG 2006a). 
Furthermore, UNDG has compiled electronic training documents for UN staff 
helping partner countries to integrate the MDGs into their national develop-
ment strategies. 750 users in over 100 countries have registered for these 
documents. Through the virtual UNDG Policy Network, which is composed 
of 115 experts from 15 UN agencies, UN staff members take turns in advis-
ing governments engaged in national planning processes (UNDG 2006a). In 
2006 60 UNCTs reported that they were working together with partner coun-
tries on the integration of the MDGs into their national poverty reduction 
strategies (ibid.). Box 2.2 describes UNDP’s role in capacity development. 
A further example relating to both capacity development and alignment is the 
National Execution (NEX) project and programme management procedure 
carried out by UNDP and UNFPA.22 NEX means that the partner government 
is responsible and accountable for formulating and managing UNDP/UNFPA 
projects/programmes. It should take precedence over Direct Execution (DEX) 
by UNDP or UNFPA, with account taken of the partner country’s needs and 
capacities (United Nations General Assembly 1993, 4). 
The main aims of NEX are to strengthen capacity development and owner-
ship by having partner countries implement projects themselves. UNFPA has 
some 30 % of its projects implemented by partner governments, the trend 
having been slightly downward in the past three years (UNDP/UNFPA Ex-
ecutive Board 2007a). In 2006 UNDP, on the other hand, had a NEX rate of 
about 60 %, the trend again being downward (UNDP/UNFPA Executive 
Board 2007b). 
                                                          
some 130 UNCTs is not required to report systematically on their activities. Various other 
UN agencies may also be operating in these fields without this being recorded centrally 
through the DGO. 
22  The term “national execution“ has given way to “national implementation” in the newly 
introduced terminology. 
The Implementation of the Paris Declaration 
German Development Institute 25 
Despite these activities of the UN development cooperation system in the 
capacity development sphere, it is claimed by some UN staff and in internal 
studies that many UNCTs still lack the expertise to assist partner countries 
with the development of national poverty reduction strategies and to provide 
policy advice in this area. Instead, many UN staff members are still trained 
for classical project implementation. Limited UNCT capacities also result in 
UNCT staff being unable in some countries to participate in high-level policy 
dialogues, e.g. in the preparation of PRSPs (UNDG 2006a). For policy dia-
logue and formulation UNCTs consequently need more capacities and exper-
tise (ibid.). To enable these capacity constraints to be recorded, the UNCTs 
are urged to carry out an internal assessment of their capacities (UNDG 
2007b, 28). 
Box 2. 2: UNDP’s role in the development of partner countries’ capacities, 
taking Rwanda as an example 
UNDP sees itself as having a capacity development role in four areas: 
• assisting with the formulation of MDG-based national development 
strategies, 
• helping partner countries to coordinate development cooperation on 
their own, e.g. through the organisation of fora for donors and the 
partner country (“round table”), 
• developing instruments for the coordination of development coopera-
tion, e.g. in the IT and planning spheres, 
• developing national financial management systems. 
With these focal areas, UNDP is addressing the demands of the Paris Declaration, 
building on its own focal area of “advisory work/capacity-building.” In general, 
UNDP’s capacity-building work is rated positively by the Multilateral Organiza-
tions Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN).a In Rwanda the UNCT 
helped the government in 2006 to identify weaknesses in country capacities at 
local and central government level as the basis for a Sector-wide Approach 
(SWAp) to capacity development. On the basis of this work a UN working group 
for the education sector drew up an action plan to assist 20 schools in two prov-
inces. 
Sources: MOPAN 2005a; UNDP 2005b; UNDG 2006; interviews with UN staff and inter-
nal documents. 
a For further details on MOPAN see footnote 20. 
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Indicators 5a and 5b – Use of country systems 
Indicators 5a and 5b measure the extent to which donors use country pro-
curement, financial management and evaluation systems for their operational 
activities. This, too, is an overriding objective of the UNDG Action Plan (see 
UNDG 2005b). Nonetheless, no systematic monitoring of progress is under-
taken within the UN agencies or by the UNDG.  
The OECD Survey concludes that the use of country systems partly depends 
on their quality, although, here again, there is only a weak correlation (OECD 
2007, 25). Donors and multilateral organisations do not, then, necessarily 
make any greater use of country systems regarded as being of a high quality 
(ibid., 26).  
According to the OECD Survey, the UN agencies administer only 18 % of 
their money through country financial management systems and use country 
procurement systems for only 8 % (OECD 2007, 119). The UN agencies 
confirm that – like other donors and multilateral organisations – they do not 
yet make much use of country procurement, financial management and 
evaluation systems (UNDG 2007b, 30; UNDG 2005d). 
Box 2.3 illustrates how UNDP supports the development of national systems. 
Box 2. 3: UNDP and the development of country procurement systems 
UNDP sees capacity development as a focal area of its work. Specifically with a 
view to meeting the commitment entered into by donors in the Paris Declaration to 
using country procurement systems (Indicator 5b), UNDP has drawn up an internal 
guide to the development of country procurement systems. UNDP’s advisory 
activities include the appraisal of country procurement capacities and their devel-
opment by means of transfers of know-how and the introduction of incentive and 
accountability systems, for example. In Sierra Leone, for instance, UNDP has 
advised the government on the development of its own procurement systems. It 
began by bringing together the interest groups, ministries and donors concerned to 
analyse needs and existing capacities. On the basis of a joint evaluation of the data, 
a strategy for capacity development was formulated. Urgent capacity issues were 
addressed with training for senior staff and a mentor/coaching relationship with 
those concerned.  
Sources: Interviews with UN staff and internal documents. 
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Their internal rules permit UNFPA, UNDP, WFP, WHO and UNICEF to 
use country reporting, monitoring and procurement systems. UNFPA al-
ready works a great deal with national procurement systems. Even though 
the internal rules have been adapted, staff at country level criticise the ab-
sence of practical guides providing instructions on the use of country sys-
tems.  
Indicator 6 – Parallel project implementation structures 
Indicator 6 of the Paris Declaration concerns the number of parallel project 
implementation units (PIUs) in each country. PIUs are project units main-
tained (financially) by donors, such as project coordination or evaluation 
units. A distinction is made between parallel and integrated project imple-
mentation units.23 Even though the UNDG Action Plan for the implementa-
tion of the Paris Declaration requires that UNCTs step up the development 
of national capacities where there are PIUs in a country (UNDG 2005b), 
there is no monitoring in this respect. The UN agencies therefore have no 
data on the number of PIUs. 
The OECD Survey reveals that the UN agencies it covers maintain an aver-
age of nine PIUs per country (OECD 2007, 19), a large number compared to 
the other donors and multilateral organisations covered by the OECD Sur-
vey. However, this high absolute number gives a distorted picture of the UN 
agencies, since the OECD adds together under the term “United Nations” the 
PIUs of various UN agencies. A high figure compared to other – individu-
ally assessed – donors is therefore hardly surprising.  
It should also be borne in mind that a purely quantitative record of PIUs is 
applicable to the UN development cooperation system to only a limited 
extent: many UN agencies maintain parallel project implementation struc-
tures to advise the government. The aim of these structures is to assist na-
tional partners – within a set time horizon – with capacity development, thus 
enabling them to implement projects themselves. If, then, implementation 
procedures help to develop capacities, a parallel structure may be appropri-
                                                          
23  Where there is a “parallel” PIU, the donor is required to account for and report on the 
implementation of the project. The donor is also responsible for selecting personnel and 
managing all activities of the unit. In the case of an “integrated” PIU, the government per-
forms these tasks.  
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ate for a predefined period. Box 2.4 describes how UNDP has already faced 
up to parallel PIUs.  
Although UNDP has already considered parallel PIUs internally, it was 
evident from interviews with UN staff that little attention has hitherto been 
paid to this subject within the UN agencies. They do not, for example, con-
duct any monitoring in this area, nor has any systematic interest been taken 
in ways of dealing with this issue. The OECD figures also indicate that the 
UN agencies still have room for improvement in this respect. 
Box 2. 4: UNDP and parallel project implementation units  
UNDP has considered project implementation units (PIUs) in an internal guide. It 
points out that the advantage of parallel PIUs is that in the short term they over-
come capacity constraints and so increase project efficiency. In the medium to long 
term, however, they may impede capacity development and country ownership. 
Consequently, where a parallel PIU is unavoidable, the requirements are that 
• it should be linked directly to the partner’s institution rather than the 
donor’s, 
• an exit strategy should be devised in advance for the handover of the 
PIU to the partner (government), 
• the PIU should be adapted to the administrative processes of the 
partner institution. 
The guide is also meant to enable UNDP staff – with the aid of a detailed question-
naire – to determine whether a PIU is parallel, integrated or partly integrated in 
relation to the partner institution.  
UNDP does not have any quantitative data on the extent to which it maintains PIUs 
or how far they are integrated into country structures. However, an exclusively 
quantitative record of PIUs is not appropriate for UNDP. For instance, one of 
UNDP’s advisory activities in 2005/06 was provided by a parallel PIU: UNDP 
provided capacity development for the Rwandan government through an Aid Co-
ordination Unit to enable the government to take responsibility for coordinating 
development cooperation in Rwanda and for the harmonisation and alignment 
process. UNDP’s action in this respect is rated as positive and consistent with the 
goals of the Paris Declaration. 
Source: Internal documents 
The Implementation of the Paris Declaration 
German Development Institute 29 
Indicator 7 – Better predictability of ODA 
Indicator 7 concerns the proportion of ODA disbursements released to part-
ner countries in accordance with an agreed (multi-year) schedule. This is 
intended to make ODA more predictable for partner countries. The donors’ 
allocation practices are such that the UN funds and programmes undertake 
their operational activities largely on the basis of one-year commitments. 
This makes medium- to long-term planning difficult for partner countries.24 
The OECD Survey confirms that the ODA provided by many UN agencies 
is hard to predict and that disbursements are usually well below the planned 
level (OECD 2007, 119). Thus only 32 % of planned resources have been 
disbursed (ibid.). The regional development banks and the World Bank 
achieve significantly better ratings in the OECD Survey, which is partly due 
to their multi-year commitments. 
The UN agencies’ poor showing in the case of this indicator is due to the 
absence of multi-year commitments by donors to the funds and programmes. 
Furthermore, resources are increasingly earmarked. The availability of these 
earmarked resources is difficult or even impossible to predict. To give partner 
countries a better basis on which to plan for UN ODA, the donors should 
change their allocation practice to multi-year commitments and reduce ear-
marking. 
2.4.2 Harmonisation 
Harmonisation within the meaning of the Paris Declaration is gauged by the 
extent to which donors use common arrangements and procedures (Indicator 
9) and conduct shared missions and analyses (Indicator 10). 
Indicator 9 – Use of common arrangements and procedures 
In the context of the Paris Declaration, progress in the case of the indicator 9 
is measured in terms of the percentage of their ODA provided by donors in 
the context of programme-based approaches, e.g. as part of a Sector-wide 
Approach (SWAp) or in the form of budget support.25 
                                                          
24  The difficult financial situation of the UN funds and programmes is also described in Fues / 
Klingebiel 2007, 233. 
25  For explanations of these aid modalities see footnote 5. 
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Their internal rules permit all UN agencies to participate (financially) in 
basket financing and SWAps. The UN funds and programmes are urged in-
ternally to participate in existing or planned SWAps. UNFPA, UNDP and 
UNICEF in particular play a practical part in these new aid modalities (for 
examples see Box 2.5 below). 
The UN agencies do not, however, have extensive financial resources to 
contribute to a SWAp or as budget support. Their financial contributions are 
often of symbolic value. In addition to that, the UN agencies’ donors would 
not consider it desirable to provide the UN agencies with resources which 
they then pass on to partner countries to finance a SWAp or a budget. This 
would turn the UN agencies into a mere stopping-off point for financial re-
sources. It is difficult to see why, in this case, the donors should not disburse 
their money directly to the partner countries.  
According to an analysis carried out by the consultancy Scanteam (2005) of 
the experience of the UNCTs in Malawi and Mozambique, the role of the UN 
agencies with regard to these new aid modalities should not be defined by 
financial contributions to programme-based approaches, since they do not 
have the financial resources to make significant financial contributions. 
Given its lack of financial resources, the UN development cooperation sys-
tem should see its role in these new aid modalities as being a neutral mediator 
and adviser in accordance with its mandate (ibid.). This would mean assisting 
governments with the implementation and management of these new aid 
modalities. Some agencies might also use their advocacy role to integrate 
certain development issues into the preparation of a SWAp (for the example 
of UNFPA see Box 2.5 below). 
Even before the emergence of the Paris Declaration UNDG published a posi-
tion paper on the role of the UN development cooperation system in SWAps 
(UNDG 2005c). According to this, financial contributions do not determine 
the participation of UN agencies in a SWAp. Instead, the agencies should 
contribute their expertise to the planning and implementation of a SWAp 
(ibid.). In the case of budget support and basket or pooled funding,26 they 
should help partner countries to implement these aid modalities and to use 
donor resources efficiently, through capacity development and services relat-
ing to the administration and management of donor resources, for instance. 
                                                          
26  For explanations of these aid modalities see footnote 5. 
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It is evident in this context that the UN development cooperation system 
needs to define its position in the implementation of the Paris Declaration as 
a matter of urgency: if the UN agencies cannot or should not make a financial 
contribution, the result at country level may be that they are not, or no longer, 
invited to the meetings of donors at which the dialogue on programmes or 
budget support takes place. If the UN agencies do not want to run the risk of 
being marginalised, they must be prepared to discuss their role and define the 
expertise with which they can make a non-monetary contribution (for exam-
ples see Box 2.5).  
During such a discussion a critical analysis needs to be made to determine 
whether the UN development cooperation system in fact has the expertise to 
advise on the planning and implementation of SWAps and on the manage-
ment of new aid modalities, such as budget support – as claimed by UNDG 
and Scanteam (see above). As regards a division of labour based on strengths, 
it has yet to be considered whether, compared to other donors, the UN agen-
cies really have this expertise.  
Although no systematic quantitative data are available on the participation of 
individual UN agencies in programme-based approaches, Box 2.5 gives an 
example of the support provided by the UN development cooperation system 
for SWAps. 
Box 2. 5: UN support for SWAps and budget support 
Example: Nicaragua 
In Nicaragua a national plan drawn up by the government and the donors provides, 
among other things, for the donors to give extensive support to SWAps. As the UN 
agencies are unable to make a financial contribution to the SWAps in Nicaragua, 
they make use of their role as advocates and mediators. Through the RC’s office 
the UN supports and chairs the donors’ and government’s round table meetings 
held to discuss the various sectors. During the formulation of the SWAps in the 
health and education sectors the UN development cooperation system was active as 
an advisor. It also contributed financially to the health sector SWAp under a pooled 
funding arrangement (for an explanation see footnote 5). 
UNDP’s role in budget support and SWAps 
In a changing development cooperation architecture characterised by new aid 
modalities, such as budget support and SWAps, UNDP sees its strengths as lying 
in areas such as capacity development and policy advice. It can contribute in the 
budget support area in three ways: 
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•  Capacity development for country management and monitoring and 
the implementation of budget support 
•  Support services/advice for national governments and donors in the 
management of pooled funding 
•  In certain circumstances, payment of financial resources to pooled 
funding arrangements which are not administered by UNDP 
As, however, UNDP does not contribute to country partners’ public coffers, it does 
not lend financial support to the balance of payments or provide budget support. To 
meet the requirements arising from these new aid modalities, UNDP needs to 
strengthen its (manpower) capacities for the areas of fund management, account-
ability systems and procurement. UNDP needs capacity development specialists 
with specific sectoral expertise. 
What has yet to be clarified, however, is whether, compared to other bi- and multi-
lateral development cooperation actors, UNDP really has the expertise to contrib-
ute in the area of budget support in the ways shown above, especially in Points 1 
and 2.  
UNFPA and Sector-wide Approaches (SWAps) 
UNFPA has been participating in SWAps since 1999. In 2002 its senior manage-
ment again emphasised the commitment to programme-based approaches. In 2006 
UNFPA was involved in SWAps in 27 countries, primarily in the health sector. In 
11 countries UNFPA also participated in pooled funding arrangements. It has 
drawn up internal guides to participation in SWAps. When participating in a 
SWAp in the health and education sectors, it sees its primary role in contributing 
its expertise on reproductive health and gender issues, advising govern-
ments/donors on these aspects and promoting policy dialogue. The eight MOPAN 
donors give UNFPA good marks for policy dialogue at country level. 
UNICEF and SWAps 
UNICEF focuses its participation in SWAps on the health and education sectors. In 
2004 UNICEF was involved in some 30 SWAps throughout the world. It advises 
partner governments on issues that concern children’s interests and assists them 
with the implementation of appropriate programmes. In Cambodia, for example, it 
has coordinated the contributions of over 50 non-governmental organisations to a 
SWAp in the education sector. UNICEF was deemed to be a good mediator be-
tween partner governments and donors where it was involved. It is therefore as-
signed the role of a coordinating unit in a SWAp. 
Sources: ECOSOC 2006a; ECOSOC 2006b; ECOSOC 2005a; MOPAN 2005b; UNDG 
2006a, 20; UNDP 2005a; UNDP/UNFPA Executive Board 2000; 2002a and 
2002b; UNFPA 2005. 
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UN staff members regard the continuing absence of guidelines to operational 
work at country level as the main impediment to a participation in these new 
aid modalities. Where guidelines do exist, they are sometimes unknown at 
country level and/or the UN staff lack the necessary qualifications to meet the 
new demands for advice and policy dialogue.  
A case study carried out by Scanteam (2005) confirms this weakness of the 
UN agencies with respect to the work of the UNCTs in Malawi and Mozam-
bique. It shows that many UN agencies have done little to come to terms with 
the new aid modalities and are often still geared to classical project ap-
proaches (see Scanteam 2005 above). 
Quantitative data on the participation of UN agencies in SWAps at country 
level can be found in the OECD Survey on Monitoring the Implementation of 
the Paris Declaration.27 This shows that the UN agencies provide less than 
30 % of their ODA in the context of SWAps (OECD 2007, 86 and 119). 
Consequently, the UN development cooperation system is still far from 
achieving the target of 66 % by 2010. However, the UN agencies are not 
alone in this respect: less than a quarter of all the donors surveyed provide 
50 % or more of their ODA in the context of SWAps (ibid., 32). 
Another empirical source of information on the UN agencies’ general har-
monisation efforts is the Multilateral Organizations Performance Assessment 
Network (MOPAN).28 According to MOPAN, UNDP is not active enough in 
harmonising with other donors (MOPAN 2005a, 10). It also tends to act in 
isolation from other UN agencies and is too inflexible because internal rules 
restrict its participation in budget support and SWAps (ibid.). UNFPA’s har-
monisation efforts are similarly considered by MOPAN to be in need of im-
provement (MOPAN 2005b, 23f.). Although it attends donor meetings, it, 
too, tends to work in isolation from other donors and makes little practical 
effort to harmonise and coordinate in its operational work (ibid.). 
This discussion of the UN development cooperation system’s contributions to 
programme-based approaches and to harmonisation with other donors is now 
followed by a description of the main reform measures taken by the UN 
                                                          
27  Here again, it should be emphasised that, owing to the methodological difficulties encoun-
tered in their collection, the OECD data provide no more than an indication of the progress 
made by the UN development cooperation system in implementing the Paris Declaration. 
28  For details on MOPAN see footnote 20. 
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agencies to increase harmonisation within the UN development cooperation 
system and to use common arrangements and procedures. It should be re-
membered that the measures considered are merely intended to improve intra-
UN harmonisation, not harmonisation with other donors within the meaning 
of the Paris Declaration. 
Harmonisation and use of common arrangements and procedures: main 
reform measures within the UN development cooperation system 
Harmonisation of business practices – HACT 
An example of the intra-UN harmonisation of business practices is the Har-
monized Approach to Cash Transfers to Implementing Partners (HACT), 
which was introduced in 2005. HACT means that, when cooperating with the 
same national partners, the UN agencies standardise their financial transfers 
to them by subjecting monetary transfers to uniform guidelines, procedures 
and reporting obligations. This reduces the partners’ transaction costs. HACT 
has so far been used only by the four ExCom agencies UNDP, UNFPA, 
UNICEF and WFP. However, this does not yet signify any advance in the 
implementation of the Paris Declaration and its understanding of harmonisa-
tion as HACT does not promote the harmonisation with other donors. The 
HACT initiative shows that, in many respects, the UN system is still overly 
intra-UN in its focus and has considerable difficulty in accomplishing minor 
reforms, which do not, however, have any links to other donors. 
Harmonised programme cycles 
The ExCom agencies now have harmonised programme cycles in almost 
every country. This means that the country programmes of the four agencies 
begin and end at the same time. Harmonised programme cycles are needed if 
there is to be joint programme planning. 
Joint services  
In 2005 over 60 UNCTs made use of joint services in such administrative 
areas as security and the organisation of missions. However, the money saved 
as a result of the use of joint services has so far been insignificant and im-
plementation difficult. One reason for this is that specialised agencies are not 
prepared to use the services of the funds and programmes. Another obstacle 
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is that business practices are only partly harmonised and internal procedures 
and rules differ (UNDG 2006a). 
United Nations Development Assistance Framework – UNDAF 
Guided by national development priorities, UNDAFs define the areas of 
activity of the UN agencies in a country and combine the contributions of the 
individual agencies to those areas.29 UN staff members regard the UNDAF as 
a mechanism that is capable of strengthening cooperation within the UN 
development cooperation system. This is also confirmed by a number of 
donors in the context of the Multilateral Organizations Performance Assess-
ment Network (MOPAN 2005a). However, many UNDAFs have weaknesses 
(COWI 2001; Longhurst 2006). The UNDAF is often seen as excessively 
intra-UN in its focus and as doing little to promote cooperation with other 
partners/donors (COWI 2001).  
Furthermore, many UNCTs do not commit themselves to clear work priori-
ties in their UNDAF (Longhurst 2006). This is due to the fact that none of the 
agencies would like to give up its activities, as this might make them less 
visible to donors. Spurred on by the competition for scarce donor resources, 
the agencies endeavour to fulfil their mandates and to avoid taking a back 
seat to other UN agencies. The agencies’ internal logic, which is geared to 
successful canvassing for contributions from donors, encourages staff to be 
guided by the goals of their own agency rather than UN-wide objectives. 
Many UNDAFs therefore formulate areas of activity in no more than very 
broad terms. 
The UNDAF is a further example of an intra-UN initiative that is intended to 
make the UN agencies more coherent in their various activities without refer-
ring to other donors. This is, then, only a first step, which must be followed 
by another towards harmonisation within the meaning of the Paris Declara-
tion. In some countries, for example, the Joint Assistance Strategies are al-
ready ahead of the UNDAF efforts, because all the donors working in a coun-
try consult each other. 
                                                          
29  Preparing a UNDAF is compulsory for UNCTs. It is preceded by a Common Country 
Assessment (CCA), in which the UN agencies jointly analyse the development challenges 
facing a country. Where national analyses of this kind already exist, they can be used dur-
ing the preparation of the UNDAF, thus making the preparation of a CCA unnecessary. 
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Joint Programmes 
Joint Programmes (JPs) are similarly intended to improve coordination 
among the UN agencies at country level. UN agencies pursuing the same 
national development goal in a country can establish a JP for the purpose. A 
JP describes the activities undertaken by the participating UN agencies to 
achieve a common development objective (see UNDG 2005g). The majority 
of JPs are implemented in areas requiring a multi-sectoral approach, such as 
HIV/Aids. While only 20 UNCTs established JPs in 2002 (UNDG 2002), a 
total of over 300 were drawn up in 2006 (UNDG 2006a, 26). JPs can reduce 
governments’ transaction costs, principally because of harmonised financing 
mechanisms (UNDG 2006e; UNDP/UNFPA Executive Board 2006). The 
partner governments participate in the preparation of the majority of JPs 
(UNDG 2006f).  
One of the main weaknesses of JPs is that only the four ExCom agencies 
participate in most of them (UNDG 2007b, 56). It is rare for the UN special-
ised agencies to be involved in JPs, and they are often seen as excessively 
UN-centred (UNDP/UNFPA Executive Board 2006). In general, it can be 
said that a JP depends for its success on good cooperation among the partici-
pating UN agencies and on the close involvement of the partner government 
in the planning process (UNDG 2005d). However, the agencies’ alignment 
with their own objectives and the corresponding instructions to staff continue 
to encourage the establishment of agency-specific programmes. There are no 
formal incentives for UN staff to participate in a JP (UNDG 2007b, 57). 
Strengthening the Resident Coordinator 
It is the RC’s task to coordinate the UN agencies’ activities at country level. 
The weakness of this system is that, as a rule, the RC is also the UNDP Resi-
dent Representative. The result of this dual role is that the other UN agencies 
view the RC with some suspicion. They fear that – especially when it comes 
to canvassing for donor resources at country level – he/she will support 
UNDP’s interests rather than those of all UN agencies. 
To strengthen the RC’s independent position, various reforms have been 
undertaken in the past. In 2006 the 180-Degree Performance Appraisal was 
introduced in over 120 countries. For the first time this procedure enables the 
UNCT to appraise the RC’s work as a coordinator and the RC to appraise the 
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cooperation among the various UN agencies. This is meant to promote ac-
countability on both sides.  
In addition, the dual role of RC and UNDP Resident Representative has now 
been separated in 30 countries through the financing of the post of a UNDP 
country director, who takes over the task of representing UNDP. The RC is 
thus able to devote all his/her attention to his/her coordinating role. The 
UNCTs welcome this (UNDG 2006a). 
Joint Office 
The Joint Office initiative is another reform measure taken to improve intra-
UN harmonisation and encourage the use of common arrangements and pro-
cedures. In a Joint Office the four ExCom agencies have a common admini-
stration, a common management in the shape of one UN representative and 
one country programme (with a joint budget), and they work together in a 
country office. One of the four agencies provides the support services for all. 
The first two Joint Offices were set up in Vietnam and Cape Verde in 2006. 
The plan is to have 20 by the end of 2007. Difficulties in implementing this 
initiative are due, among other things, to unharmonised business practices 
and services (UNDG 2006a). Further harmonisation of business practices is 
therefore important. 
All in all, the Joint Office initiative has been welcomed in the UN system, 
since it brings to an end the competition between the funds and programmes 
for scarce donor resources at country level and the partner governments bene-
fit from the smaller UN administrations (UNDG 2006c). The aim must be to 
have not only the ExCom agencies but also the UN specialised agencies par-
ticipate in the installation of further Joint Offices. A systematic appraisal of 
experience with the Joint Office initiative has yet to be undertaken. Boxes 2.6 
and 2.7 give an overview of the progress so far made in implementing this 
initiative. 
Box 2. 6: UN harmonisation at country level: Joint Offices in Cape Verde 
and Vietnam 
In Cape Verde and Vietnam UNDP, UNICEF, WFP and UNFPA have had a joint 
representative, a single country programme, a joint budget and shared premises 
since 2006. One agency provides services for the whole UN team. As the individ-
ual agencies retain their specific mandates, results achieved by the joint country 
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programme can be attributed to the various funds and programmes. In Cape Verde 
the strong commitment of the national government and the UNCT to the reform 
process and the close cooperation within the UNCT are the factors of success of 
this reform. 
In Vietnam the strong leadership role played by the Vietnamese government is the 
driving force in the reform process. It attaches particular importance to relations 
with the UN agencies in the country and has, for example, chaired a working group 
on the question of UN reform in Vietnam. The UNCT in Vietnam has also been 
heavily involved in the reform process. In general, the UN development coopera-
tion system has played a major part in Vietnam in the implementation of the Paris 
Declaration. In cooperation with the Vietnamese government it has, for example, 
drawn up the Hanoi Core Statement on Aid Effectiveness, a commitment by donors 
and the government to common objectives akin to the Paris Declaration. 
Sources: UNDG 2006c; 2006d; 2006e. 
 
Box 2. 7: Initial experience after a year of a Joint Office 
According to UNDG, there is no single model for a Joint Office. Instead, each one 
must be appropriate to the individual country context. To support the Change 
Management process, it is important, UNDG claims, for the headquarters of the 
UN agencies to appoint staff to act in an advisory capacity. A twin-track process of 
communication between staff at country level and staff at headquarters is essential 
if difficulties and reservations are to be channelled back into the reform process. A 
harmonised programme cycle facilitates the reform process leading to a Joint Of-
fice. Each UN agency must remain responsible for its share of the joint country 
programme. UNDG considers it important that business practices are further har-
monised and that practical guides on the transition to a Joint Office are drawn up. 
Sources: UNDG 2006b; 2006c. 
UN Houses 
At country level cooperation among the ExCom agencies has improved with 
the establishment of UN Houses. To date, 60 UN Houses have been set up, 
providing premises for the RC and the representatives of the ExCom agencies 
and enabling them to share their services for country programmes as far as 
possible (ECOSOC 2005b). Unlike Joint Offices, UN Houses signify no more 
than the co-location of the UN representatives in a country under one roof. As 
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described above, the Joint Offices go much further, in that they also entail 
joint country programmes and a joint administration.  
The aims of the reform measures that have been described are intra-UN har-
monisation and the use of common arrangements and procedures within the 
UN development cooperation system. The UNDG refers to this intra-UN 
harmonisation agenda as “intra-UN implementation of the Paris Declara-
tion” (UNDG 2007b, 34). According to UNDG, an internal division of labour 
among the UN agencies is important if they are to be able to contribute as a 
coherent “United Nations” to processes at country level (ibid., 31). UNDG 
regards all these processes as an “internal dimension” of the Paris Declaration 
(ibid., 29).  
Nonetheless, it can be said that this internal harmonisation and division of 
labour form no more than a first step. Harmonisation within the meaning of 
the Paris Declaration – better coordination with other donors – is not directly 
advanced by the UN development cooperation system with these reforms. 
The UN development cooperation system’s next step must therefore be to go 
beyond this intra-UN harmonisation and become increasingly involved in 
coordination with other development cooperation actors. 
Indicator 10 – Shared missions and country analyses 
Indicator 10 measures the extent to which donors carry out country missions 
and analyses together. The UN agencies and UNDG do not have any quanti-
tative data on this aspect. Within the UN, however, it is known that the agen-
cies carry out a large number of missions (UNDG 2007b, 30). The UNCT in 
Tanzania, for example, reports over 250 UN missions in 2006. The data con-
tained in the OECD Survey indicate that the UN agencies conduct only 30 % 
of their missions jointly with other donors (OECD 2007, 119). This finding 
puts the UN agencies above the average calculated by the OECD of 18 % of 
missions conducted jointly (ibid., 33). The UN agencies (a total of 2,876 
missions) and the World Bank (2,058) conduct by far the most missions (in 
third place is France with 687) (ibid., 87). 
However, the high absolute figure shown in the OECD Survey (2,876 mis-
sions) gives a distorted picture of the UN agencies, since the Survey adds 
together the missions of several UN agencies under the heading “United 
Nations.” If the absolute figures for all 22 bilateral donors were added to-
gether in the OECD Survey, the result would by 3,822 missions. This figure 
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would say as little about individual bilateral donors as the 2,876 missions 
counted for the “United Nations” say about individual UN agencies. 
An exclusively quantitative record of UN missions would, however, ignore 
the fact that many of those missions are technical. Technical missions are not 
carried out because of specific donor interests, such as checking the progress 
of a project, but rather at the request of the government or partner institution 
for advisory purposes. Yet UN staff point out that few of these technical 
missions are conducted jointly by UN agencies. 
Shared country analyses are carried out by the UN development cooperation 
system with the help of the Common Country Assessment (CCA). In a CCA 
the UN funds, programmes and specialised agencies represented in a country 
together analyse the development challenges facing the country. This shared 
analytical process has led to greater coordination and understanding among 
the UN agencies. One weakness of the CCA is that it is an entirely intra-UN 
analytical process. As some CCAs are carried out in parallel to country ana-
lytical and planning processes, UNCTs are at risk of being excluded from 
these country processes (COWI 2001; UNDG 2006d).30 
Nor is a CCA conducted in agreement with other donors or geared to 
strengthening the partner country’s capacity to analyse and formulate devel-
opment priorities for itself. What must be regarded as positive, however, is 
that UNCTs have now been instructed not to carry out CCAs of their own any 
more if country poverty reduction strategies or country analyses cover all 
aspects considered relevant by the UN. In practice, however, it is difficult to 
decide when a country process meets the quality requirements of the UN 
agencies and a CCA is therefore no longer needed.  
In 2005 seven UNCTs31 decided against preparing a CCA, using country 
planning mechanisms instead (UNDG 2006a). Most do so because they see 
this process as overly UN-centred. A CCA would merely have duplicated the 
countries’ own analyses, e.g. a PRSP, in the cases concerned (UNDG 2006d). 
Participation in country planning processes was regarded by the UNCTs as a 
                                                          
30  A UNDG guide on the role of the UN at country level in the preparation of a Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) was compiled in 2003. What is emphasised here, how-
ever, is how the CCA complements the PRSP (UNDG 2003a). 
31  Ethiopia, Cambodia, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, Senegal and Tanzania 
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step towards meeting the commitments arising from the Paris Declaration 
(ibid.). 
For the UN agencies, the OECD Survey puts the proportion of common 
country analyses at 63 % (OECD 2007, 119). With this figure, the UN agen-
cies have already almost achieved the target for common country analyses of 
66 %. At a total of 945 country analyses in 34 countries, however, they lead 
the field of the donors and multilateral organisations surveyed, the European 
Commission taking second place with 245 analyses in 34 countries (ibid., 
88). But, here again, it must be said that this absolute figure distorts the pic-
ture of the UN agencies, since it combines the country analyses of several UN 
agencies under the collective term “United Nations.” 
2.4.3 Managing for Results 
Managing for results32 calls for development cooperation activities to be 
planned in such a way that their progress is assessed against predetermined 
results. In the context of the Paris Declaration this means donors undertaking 
to link their programme planning and their available resources to the planned 
results. Donors also commit themselves to using the partner countries’ per-
formance assessment frameworks where the quality and capacity of these 
country systems permit.  
For the UN development cooperation system the UNDAF is the main instru-
ment used by the UN agencies at country level for results-oriented manage-
ment. The UNDAF contains a results matrix that records the contributions of 
the various agencies to the envisaged development objectives and compares 
activities and available resources. On this basis, the UN agencies must show 
in their country programmes what contribution they make to the achievement 
of the UNDAF objectives.  
In their Multi-year Funding Framework (MYFF) and Medium-term Strategic 
Plan (MTSP) the UN funds and programmes define their respective overrid-
ing objectives, to whose achievement their work at country is meant to con-
tribute. With computer-based planning instruments (ATLAS in the case of 
UNDP, UNFPA and UNIFEM, for instance), work at country level is linked 
directly to Results-based Management (RBM). With the aid of these instru-
                                                          
32  Also known as Results-based Management (RBM). 
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ments the country offices report how their resources are used to achieve the 
predetermined development results.  
The ExCom agencies UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF and WFP, have recently 
brought their RBM terminologies into line with the OECD/DAC glossary of 
terms and so taken an important step towards greater harmonisation within 
the meaning of the Paris Declaration. DGO is currently working on the es-
tablishment of guidelines for an integrated RBM system.33 Monitoring and 
reporting requirements and evaluation systems, however, have yet to be 
harmonised among the UN agencies.  
There is no systematic information on whether the UN agencies use partner 
countries’ performance assessment frameworks. However, the UNDAF is 
always prepared in cooperation with the partner government and the review 
of the agreed results is also conducted jointly. 
2.4.4 Mutual Accountability 
For donors the “mutual accountability” dimension entails the commitment to 
provide partner governments with up-to-date and transparent information on 
their development cooperation activities. This is intended to enable partner 
governments to draw up reliable reports on development cooperation in their 
countries. The UN agencies are required to report to partner governments on 
the allocation of their core resources. In UNDP’s case, for example, this con-
cerns Target Resources allocated from the Core (TRAC). 
It is difficult, on the other hand, to give partners up-to-date information on 
the allocation of non-core resources. The allocation of these resources to the 
UN agencies is decentralised, and the agencies’ Executive Boards are not 
consulted. Informing partner governments comprehensively on these re-
sources is difficult, if not impossible, since the UN agencies themselves often 
do not know at the beginning of the year what resources donors will make 
available to them. If the UN agencies are able to provide systematic and up-
to-date information on only a few of their disbursements to partners, it is 
because of donor attitudes, which have led to the steady growth of earmarked 
resources. 
                                                          
33  In this context “integrated” means that the internal RBM rules are also consistent with the 
guidelines of the various UN agencies on reporting and monitoring, for example. 
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Indicator 12 of this dimension shows whether donors and partner countries 
jointly assess their progress in meeting the commitments they have both en-
tered into. Within the UN development cooperation system there is no moni-
toring of the extent to which the various UN agencies participate in mutual 
progress assessment mechanisms and processes in partner countries. The 
OECD Survey does not reveal what progress individual donors have so far 
made in meeting this commitment. It merely states which developing coun-
tries have installed mechanisms for the mutual monitoring of progress and 
which have not (OECD 2007, 36): 44 % (= 15 countries) of the 34 surveyed 
have mechanisms of this kind (ibid.). 
2.5 Summary and appraisal 
The implementation of the Paris Declaration in the UN development coopera-
tion system is summarised in Table 2.1 to make it easier to understand the 
complex reform process. 
Table 2. 1: Summary: progress and weaknesses in the implementation  
of the Paris Declaration in the UN development cooperation 
system  
State of implementation Dimension of the  
Paris Declaration 
Progress Weaknesses 
Alignment 
Indicator 3 (Alignment 
with country develop-
ment strategies) 
 
- UNDAF as UN-
wide planning in-
strument 
 
- UNDAF often weak conceptu-
ally 
- Inadequate incentive systems, 
since work aligned with objec-
tives of individual UN agen-
cies 
Indicator 4 
(Capacity development 
through harmonised 
country programmes) 
- Capacity devel-
opment as focal 
area of UN opera-
tional work 
- Partly inadequate qualifica-
tions of staff at country level 
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Indicator 5a and 5b 
(Use of country sys-
tems) 
- Use permitted by 
intra-agency 
guidelines 
- Absence of practical guides 
- Weak country systems 
Indicator 6 
(Avoidance of parallel 
project implementation 
structures) 
- - No monitoring, but indications 
of too many parallel project 
implementation units 
Indicator 7 
(Better predictability 
of ODA) 
- - Poor predictability due to 
donors’ one-year commitments 
and high proportion of ear-
marked resources 
Harmonisation 
Indicator 9 
(Use of common  
arrangements/ proce-
dures) 
 
- Participation in 
programme-based 
approaches possi-
ble for UN agen-
cies 
- Reforms aimed at 
intra-UN harmo-
nisation (HACT, 
Joint Offices, etc.) 
 
- Reforms overly intra-UN 
- UN development cooperation 
system not yet strategically 
geared to new aid modalities 
- Some inadequate qualification 
of UN staff 
- Not yet fully harmonised 
business practices; guide-
lines/rules preventing closer 
cooperation among UN agen-
cies, e.g. rules on separate re-
porting to Executive Boards. 
Indicator 10 
(Common missions/ 
country analysis) 
- CCA as common 
UN analysis 
- CCA entirely intra-UN 
- Few common UN missions 
and high absolute number of 
UN missions 
Managing for results - UNDAF as plan-
ning instrument 
- MYFF and MTSP  
- UNDAF often weak conceptu-
ally 
- No integrated RBM system,  
no common monitoring/ 
evaluation 
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Mutual  
accountability 
- Core resources 
systematically 
reported to part-
ners 
- Non-core resources allocated 
without Executive Boards be-
ing consulted, therefore diffi-
cult to record and generally 
hard to predict. 
Source: Author’s own compilation. 
The absence of monitoring of the implementation of the Paris Declaration 
within the UN development cooperation system means that there is no reli-
able data basis for statements on progress that implementation is making. Box 
2.8 provides no more than a snapshot of the state of implementation on the 
basis of available documents, interviews with UN staff and the OECD Sur-
vey.  
To summarise, the findings of the OECD Survey are displayed graphically 
below. Figure 2.1 thus gives an overview of the OECD’s findings on the 
implementation of the Paris Declaration within the UN development coopera-
tion system and compares them with the average figures for all donors cov-
ered and the targets for 2010. As the targets for Indicators 5a, 5b and 7 are 
not based on percentages, they are not shown in Figure 2.1. As Indicator 6 
(avoidance of parallel implementation units) is expressed in absolute figures, 
it, too, is not shown here. 
Figure 2.1 shows that the results achieved by the UN development coopera-
tion system are generally not too bad when compared to the average for all 
donors. Only the results of Indicators 3 (proportion of ODA for the govern-
ment sector as reported on the national budget), 5a and 5b (use of country 
systems) and 7 (proportion of ODA flows released in accordance with an 
agreed schedule) are below the average for all donors. This comparison also 
reveals that all the donors and multilateral organisations surveyed still have a 
long way to go before they achieve the agreed targets. Even though the meth-
odological difficulties in the collection of data which have already been dis-
cussed mean that the findings on the UN development cooperation system 
cannot be regarded as accurately reflecting progress made in implementation, 
they do provide a general indication of the situation and of possible weak-
nesses. 
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Figure 2. 1: Findings of the OECD Survey on the implementation of the Paris 
Declaration: progress made by the UN development cooperation 
system and average for all donors 
 
Sources: OECD 2007, author’s own compilation and own calculations in some cases. 
NB:  
Indicator 3: Proportion of ODA for the government sector, as reported on the national budget. 
Indicator 4: Proportion of technical cooperation implemented through coordinated pro-
grammes. 
Indicator 5a: Proportion of ODA flows using the public financial management system. 
Indicator 5b: Proportion of ODA flows using the partner country’s public procurement sys-
tems. 
Indicator 7: Proportion of ODA flows released in accordance with an agreed schedule. 
Indicator 9: Proportion of ODA flows provided in the context of programme-based 
approaches. 
Indicator 10a: Proportion of donors’ field missions undertaken jointly. 
Indicator 10b: Proportion of country analyses undertaken jointly. 
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Besides weaknesses in implementation, the analysis shows that the UN de-
velopment cooperation system has recognised the dynamism emanating from 
the Paris Declaration. The UN agencies are committed to the new develop-
ment consensus at managerial level and communicate this, too (see Chapter 
2.3). The internal reforms initiated since the late 1990s are consistent with the 
goals of the Paris Declaration. Despite this, many of these reforms are highly 
intra-UN in their focus (see UNDG 2005e) and so constitute no more than a 
first step that must be followed by others leading to better coordination with 
other development cooperation actors. 
In Part 5, the final part of this study, the weaknesses identified in the imple-
mentation of the Paris Declaration serve as the basis for the formulation of 
recommendations for determining the BMZ’s position. However, the devel-
opments sparked by the High-level Panel with its report in late 2006 will first 
be analysed in the light of the Paris Declaration, since they are to be taken 
into account in the determination of the BMZ’s position. 
3 Analysis and appraisal of the report of the High-level 
Panel in the light of the Paris Declaration 
At the UN World Summit in September 2005 the UN member states called 
on the Secretary-General to put forward proposals for strengthening the man-
agement and coordination of the UN agencies’ operational activities in the 
areas of development, humanitarian assistance and the environment. In Feb-
ruary 2006 the Secretary-General instructed the High-level Panel on UN 
System-wide Coherence in the Areas of Development, Humanitarian Assis-
tance, and the Environment to draw up proposals for reforming the UN agen-
cies’ operational and normative activities in these areas. In November 2006 
the High-level Panel (HLP) submitted its final report. 
The new Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon, officially submitted the report to 
the General Assembly in March 2007. In June 2007 the President of the Gen-
eral Assembly appointed Barbados and Luxembourg as co-chairs for the 
proceedings of the General Assembly. From June 2007 the member states 
were to consider the report, broken down into thematic sections.34 Such pro-
                                                          
34  For an overview of the lengthy and politicised intergovernmental processes of negotiation 
on UN reforms see Luck 2005. In this context Maxwell (2005) proposes an eight-stage ap-
proach to increasing the effectiveness of reform processes in the multilateral sphere. 
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ceedings might lead to General Assembly resolutions, which would be bind-
ing on the funds and programmes. 
The targets set in the Paris Declaration should play a central role in the fur-
ther discussion of the HLP report, since the UN development cooperation 
system must be assessed against the achievement of the Paris Declaration 
indicators. Other reforms initiated by the HLP report should therefore be 
consistent with the Paris Declaration. The HLP report will consequently be 
analysed below in the light of the Paris Declaration, its dimensions being 
compared with the recommendations made in the report for the development 
sphere. On this basis, it will be possible to identify areas of the Paris Declara-
tion of which the HLP report does not take sufficient account. 
Harmonisation 
The High-level Panel deals with the harmonisation dimension in its proposals 
for the UN agencies to work together more coherently at country level. Under 
the headings One Country Programme, One Leader, One Budgetary Frame-
work and One Office the Panel sets out recommendations for more closely 
coordinated work of the funds, programmes and specialised agencies at coun-
try level. It thus builds on reform measures that have already been initiated 
and are discussed in the previous part of this study. 
The proposed One Country Programme would mean that the UN agencies 
represented in a country would establish a joint multi-year programme based 
on a joint analysis of the country situation and also involving agencies not 
represented in the country concerned. In the One Country Programme the UN 
agencies would cooperate with the partner government in specifying areas of 
activity in line with the partner country’s priorities. Contributions from the 
various UN agencies participating in the One Country Programme would be 
allotted to each area of activity. 
The One Country Programme would be financed by an MDG Strategy Sup-
port Fund into which the UN agencies’ donors would pay contributions in the 
form of pooled funding. The aim is to put an end to the small-scale project 
funding by donors at country level which has done a great deal to fragment 
the UN project landscape. If this system proves successful, an MDG Funding 
Mechanism is to be established at central level to combine the funding of 
country programmes in a single financing modality. This could put an end to 
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micro-project financing and lead to far more closely harmonised work by the 
UN agencies at country level. 
In its proposals for One Leader the HLP recommends that the position of the 
Resident Coordinator (RC) be strengthened. The RC would be able, for ex-
ample, to decide on the distribution of funds not originating from the agen-
cies’ core resources for the One Country Programme. The RC’s direct access 
to donor resources would be new and would upgrade his position. Another 
innovation would be UNDP’s establishment of a firewall between its pro-
grammatic work and the management of the RC system. UNDP would also 
withdraw from programmatic work – apart from the areas of governance and 
crisis prevention/reconstruction – and introduce a code of conduct for ap-
praising its performance at country level. 
It is proposed that UNDP should withdraw from certain areas of activity 
because it is active in areas in which other UN agencies have competencies, 
such as HIV/Aids. Its concentration on areas in which it alone is competent 
might reduce the competition among UN agencies. Moreover, UNDP’s role 
as the impartial administrator of the RC system might be strengthened in the 
absence of areas in which there was a conflict of interests between UNDP’s 
coordinating and programmatic roles (and the associated canvassing for do-
nor resources). 
UNDP’s withdrawal from programmatic work and its concentration on coor-
dinating UN operational activities is therefore to be welcomed as consistent 
with improving the harmonisation of UN development cooperation (see also 
earlier analyses of UNDP’s reform and role: Klingebiel 1998; Luck 2003). 
The High-level Panel’s proposals thus build on the reform already initiated 
with a view to strengthening the RC and making him/her independent. The 
proposals should be endorsed. 
The One Budgetary Framework recommended by the High-level Panel would 
reflect all donor contributions to the UN agencies in country X. It would have 
three sources of funding: first, donor contributions to the core resources spent 
by the UN agencies in country X; second, earmarked donor contributions to 
individual UN agencies in country X; and third, donor contributions to the 
newly introduced One Country Programme. The aim is that donors should 
eventually abandon the earmarked funding of individual projects (the second 
source of funding above) and make contributions only to core resources and 
 Martina Vatterodt 
50 German Development Institute 
the One Country Programme. The UN agencies would report to the partner 
government once a year on progress and expenditure on each defined result.  
The High-level Panel further proposes that UN agencies willing to undertake 
reforms should be promised full funding of their core resources. Savings 
achieved through improved cooperation would be paid into a special fund for 
UN development cooperation. 
Similar to the UN House that has already been introduced (see Chapter 
2.4.2), the agencies represented in a country would have a One Office. This 
would mean the establishment of joint office premises and administrative 
offices with joint procurement, communication and staff services. For this the 
High-level Panel also recommends further harmonisation of business prac-
tices in such areas as staff, procurement and reporting.  
These proposals from the High-level Panel are based on the reforms that have 
already been initiated (see Chapter 2.4.2). Their implementation could lead to 
further harmonisation within the UN development cooperation system. How-
ever, the HLP report does not consider how the UN agencies might improve 
their coordination with other donors/partners.  
The High-level Panel puts forward proposals for greater coherence at central 
level as well as country level. These proposals concern the governance area 
of the UN development cooperation system. The High-level Panel recom-
mends, for example, the establishment of a Sustainable Development Board 
(SDB), which would control and approve One Country Programmes and 
oversee the RC system. The individual Executive Boards of the ExCom 
agencies, UNDP, UNFPA, WFP and UNICEF, and their joint meetings – 
which have no power to take decisions – would be absorbed into the SDB.  
The HLP report further recommends that a Development Policy and Opera-
tions Group (DPOG) support the planning and implementation of the One 
Country Programmes. The UNDP Administrator would chair the DPOG and, 
as UN Development Coordinator, report to the SDB on the implementation of 
the One Country Programmes. The SDB would also be supported by a De-
velopment Finance and Performance Unit, which would carry out internal 
evaluations of performance and expenditure.  
These recommendations by the High-level Panel for the reorganisation of the 
governance of the UN funds and programmes could make UN development 
cooperation more coherent, since standardisation of governance and planning 
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structures at central level might put an end to the sometimes incoherent man-
agement requirements. The funds and programmes could thus work in accor-
dance with uniform guidelines. This might also encourage the UN agencies to 
gear themselves to UN-wide targets.  
A further proposal for greater harmonisation concerns improved coordination 
with the Bretton Woods Institutions, i.e. the World Bank Group and the In-
ternational Monetary Fund. The UN Secretary-General and the Executive 
Directors of the World Bank and IMF should conduct a joint review of their 
respective mandates and then come to a formal agreement on their roles at 
central and country level. An approach of this kind is to be welcomed, since 
the World Bank is now active in many areas of technical cooperation, usually 
with extensive financial resources, but does not systematically coordinate its 
activities with other UN agencies.  
The Panel also recommends the standardisation of UN regional structures. 
The regional offices of the funds and programmes are currently located in 
different countries, and the definition of “region” also varies. More coherent 
regional structures might result in the country offices providing more uniform 
advice.  
Another of the Panel’s recommendations calls for improved coherence 
among donors along the lines of an all-of-government approach. This would 
require donors to make their own policies/conduct in the various governance 
structures more coherent. The problem addressed by the Panel here is that the 
division of responsibilities among various government departments some-
times results in an incoherent policy towards the UN agencies and the decen-
tralised allocation of resources to them. The implementation of this proposal 
might substantially reduce the fragmentation of the UN development coop-
eration system, since the member states (= donors) would act more coherently 
in their dealings with the UN agencies. 
Alignment 
Where alignment is concerned, the High-level Panel proposes that the One 
Country Programmes it recommends should be aligned with national priori-
ties. The alignment of UN country programmes with national priorities is 
already standard practice in the UN development cooperation system (see 
Chapter 2.4.1 above). 
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Managing for results 
The subject of “managing for results” is not explicitly referred to in the HLP 
report. The High-level Panel merely recommends that the One Country Pro-
grammes should be results-based, with clearly defined results and priorities 
(HLP 2006, 13). This rule already applies to UN country programmes. In 
addition, the Bretton Woods Institutions and the UN agencies should develop 
joint frameworks for the measurement of results (HLP 2006, 36). The High-
level Panel also recommends the establishment of a single, UN-wide evalua-
tion system involving uniform evaluation methods and results-based man-
agement guidelines (HLP 2006, 41). The Bretton Woods Institutions and UN 
agencies should assist partner countries with the joint measurement of devel-
opment results. The implementation of these proposals could strengthen this 
area of the UN development cooperation system, since hitherto there has been 
no single RBM and evaluation system. 
Mutual accountability 
The HLP report does not contain any proposals for the UN development 
cooperation system to contribute to mutual accountability within the meaning 
of the Paris Declaration. 
To make it easier to appreciate the High-level Panel’s proposals, they are 
once again compared in Table 3.1 with the dimensions of the Paris Declara-
tion in table form. New proposals not based on reforms which have already 
been undertaken or discussed are marked as such. 
 
Table 3. 1: Summary: comparison of the dimensions of the Paris Declara-
tion with the recommendations contained in the HLP report 
Dimension  
Paris Declaration Recommendation in the HLP reporta b 
Alignment 
 
Recommendation 1: One Country Programme to be 
aligned with national priorities (p. 13) 
 
Recommendation 35: BWIs and UN agencies jointly 
to assist countries with their national development 
strategies, e.g. PRSPs (p. 36) 
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Intra-UN  
harmonisation 
 
One leader 
 
Recommendation 2: Strengthened position of RC  
(p. 14) 
 
Recommendation 3: UNDP’s withdrawal from 
programmatic work (p. 14) (NEW) 
 
Recommendation 4: UNDP to establish institutional 
firewall for management of RC system, code of 
conduct for performance appraisal at country level 
(p. 14) (NEW) 
One Programme 
 
Recommendation 1: One Country Programme to 
involve UN-wide expertise (p. 13) 
Funding 
 
 
 
 
 
Recommendation 38: One budgetary framework  
(p. 39): Transparent overview of three sources of 
funding of UN agencies at country level. Funding of 
One Country Programme through Pooled Funding 
(MDG Strategy Support Fund) (NEW) 
 
 
Recommendation 39: Complete funding of core 
resources of UN agencies willing to reform (p. 39) 
(NEW) 
 
Recommendation 40: Savings due to reforms to be 
paid into fund for UN development cooperation  
(pp. 39 f.) (NEW) 
One Office 
 
Recommendation 1: UN agencies to use joint ser-
vices (p. 13) 
 
Recommendation 42: Harmonisation of business 
practices (p. 41) 
Intra-UN harmonisa-
tion in general 
 
Recommendation 25: Establishment of a working 
group to put forward proposals for consolidation of 
UN units (p. 29) 
 
Recommendations 27/28: Establishment of Sustain-
able Development Board (p. 31) (NEW) 
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Recommendation 30: UNDP Administrator to chair 
new Development Policy and Operations Group as 
Development Coordinator (p. 33) (NEW) 
 
Recommendations 31/32: Uniform organisation of 
regional structures (p. 34) 
 
Recommendations 33/34: All-of-government  
approach, good multilateral donorship (p. 35) 
 
Recommendations 35/36: Better cooperation  
between BWIs and UN agencies (p. 36) 
Managing for results 
 
Recommendation 1: Results-based One Country 
Programme, integrated RBM (p. 13) 
 
Recommendation 35: BWIs and UN agencies to 
collect and measure data jointly (p. 36) 
 
Recommendations 42/43: RBM and evaluation 
system to be improved/standardised (p. 41) 
Mutual accountability - 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
NB: 
a For the purposes of the above table, the recommendations contained in the HLP report have 
 been numbered in the sequence of their appearance in the report, with the number of the 
 page in the report added. 
b Proposals not based on current reforms and requiring an intergovernmental decision-making 
 process, since there is as yet no mandate for their implementation, are marked “NEW”. 
 
An analysis of the recommendations for harmonisation shows that – with the 
exception of the reference to the BWIs – all are designed to promote intra-
UN harmonisation. Improved cooperation with other donors/partners is not 
singled out for discussion. The proposals for a uniform system of results-
based management and evaluation of system-wide results meet the demands 
of the Paris Declaration. Implementation of this recommendation would be 
welcome. In the area of alignment the HLP report takes up what has already 
been implemented in the UN development cooperation system. The Panel 
does not make any proposals for strengthening mutual accountability. 
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The implementation of the High-level Panel’s proposals for reform at country 
level (One UN = One Country Programme, One Leader, One Budgetary 
Framework, One Office) began in early 2007, since the funds and pro-
grammes had already been given a mandate for these reforms in the Triennial 
Comprehensive Policy Review.35 For the implementation of One UN there 
are currently eight pilot countries: Vietnam, Pakistan, Mozambique, Tanza-
nia, Cape Verde, Uruguay, Albania and Rwanda (Dervis 2006). Proposals 
requiring an intergovernmental decision-making process owing to the ab-
sence of a mandate for their implementation (see the recommendations in 
Box 3.1 marked “NEW”) were to be discussed by the member states from 
June 2007. 
The reform initiatives analysed in Chapters 2 and 3 of this study raise the 
question as to how the United Nations intends to position itself with its de-
velopment cooperation – on the basis of its strengths – in the international 
development cooperation system in the future. This question will be dis-
cussed in the following with due regard for the goal horizon set by the Paris 
Declaration. 
4 Implications for the positioning of the United 
Nations in the international development 
architecture 
4.1 The question of the strengths of the UN agencies in 
development cooperation 
The debate on the strengths of the UN agencies’ development cooperation is 
not new. The UN agencies occasionally come under greater pressure to jus-
tify themselves in this respect than bilateral organisations. This is because it 
is difficult, if not impossible, for the donors to exercise direct control over the 
UN agencies. Furthermore, contributing to the UN agencies’ core resources 
                                                          
35  The mandate of the UN funds and programmes for the implementation of central reforms, 
such as the Joint Office, results from the Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review (TCPR), 
in which the UN member states take stock of the UN’s operational activities at country 
level and call on the funds and programmes, which report to the General Assembly (UNDP, 
UNICEF, UNFPA and WFP), to implement reforms. The TCPR is adopted every three 
years in the form of a General Assembly resolution – the last being in 2004 – and is binding 
on the four funds and programmes. 
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does not make for donor visibility, which runs counter to the claim to bilat-
eral design voiced by many donors. Frequently, the donors also call – and 
rightly so – for evidence that the funds they have provided are being used 
efficiently, since they are accountable to their taxpayers. 
As regards the implementation of the Paris Declaration by the United Na-
tions, the following will analyse which of the strengths of the UN develop-
ment cooperation system can be used in the continuing fulfilment of the 
commitments arising from the Paris Declaration.  
The basis for the legitimacy of the work of the UN agencies in the develop-
ment sphere is to be found in Article 1 (3) of the UN Charter, according to 
which one of the UN’s goals is “[…] to achieve international co-operation in 
solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humani-
tarian character” (United Nations 1945, 2). One of the UN’s strengths in this 
context is the universality of its membership. Each of its member states for-
mally has the same right to vote as the others (one country – one vote). Even 
on the Executive Boards of the UN funds and programmes and the supervi-
sory bodies of the specialised agencies each country has one vote. 
Universal membership and formal equality in voting give the UN agencies a 
special basis of legitimacy (Jolly et al. 2004, 301). This organisational struc-
ture is intended to prevent any unilateral governmental influence on the 
agenda and work of the UN agencies, which is why they are perceived to be 
impartial actors. In contrast, the distribution of votes in the Bretton Woods 
Institutions, the World Bank and the IMF, corresponds to the financial con-
tributions made by countries to the organisation (one dollar – one vote). The 
Bretton Woods Institutions are therefore perceived to be donor-dominated, 
especially by the developing countries (see Jolly et al. 2004, 302; Menocal / 
Rogerson 2006, 15f.). 
The idea underlying multilateralism is also evident from the organisational 
structure of the UN funds, programmes and specialised agencies: the entire 
community of states adopts the country programmes and determines the dis-
tribution of core resources. Many developing countries also contribute to the 
UN agencies’ core resources. The UN agencies therefore have the reputation 
of enabling the developing countries to play a special part in country pro-
grammes and UN agendas (see Turner et al. 2003). They are thus well ac-
cepted and trusted in the development sphere by the developing countries as a 
result of the latter’s involvement and strong voice (this is confirmed in 
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UNDP’s case by Klingebiel 1998, 147, and Messner et al. 2005, 43). From 
the developing countries’ point of view the provision of untied and uncondi-
tional UN ODA also represents a strength of UN development cooperation 
(Fues 2005, 67; Fues / Klingebiel 2007, 235).  
Their impartial role and the universality of their membership give the UN 
agencies a special basis of legitimacy for their standard-setting function. 
They are thus able to set globally binding standards and also to ensure com-
pliance with them. As they are perceived as impartial actors, they are deemed 
to have strengths in operational work in such politically sensitive areas as 
reproductive health, good governance, human rights, crisis prevention and 
reconstruction. As impartial actors, they are often able to address these sub-
jects better at country level than bilateral actors.  
Many UN agencies, however, are also operationally active in other areas such 
as health, education and the promotion of the private sector. The strength of 
impartial UN agencies in these areas does not simply evolve. But so far – 
apart from various country studies36 and reflections by certain UN agencies37 
– there has been no systematic research to identify sectors in which UN agen-
cies have significant strengths, such as proven expertise, in their operational 
work. Nor has it yet been shown in respect of work in politically and cultur-
ally sensitive areas that the UN generally has a definite strength compared to 
other (bilateral) actors. 
A further unique feature of the UN agencies in the development sphere is 
their role as an alternative voice in the international development debate, 
which is due to their standard-setting work. Owing to their alternative, mul-
tidisciplinary approaches focused on people in the process of development, 
many UN agencies have been able to provide major food for thought in the 
international development debate (Jolly et al. 2004, 301f.), an example being 
UNDP with its annual Human Development Report. 
The presence of many UN agencies in almost all developing countries – even 
at times of crisis – is, moreover, a special feature of UN development  
                                                          
36  In 2005 Scanteam, for example, examined the potential role and the strength of the UN, 
taking Malawi and Mozambique as its examples. The findings of that study have been con-
sidered at some length in Chapter 2.4.2. The Nordic UN Project in the early 1990s included 
eight country studies, in which the partner countries commented very favourably on 
UNDP’s performance (Nordic UN Project 1990). 
37  For a discussion of UNDP’s role and strength see Messner et al. 2005, 43. 
 Martina Vatterodt 
58 German Development Institute 
cooperation. This decentralised organisational structure and the involvement 
of local and regional know-how and experience through the employment of 
local staff single out the UN agencies as development cooperation actors at 
pains to ensure that country-specific and country-owned development strate-
gies are implemented (see Jolly et al. 2004, 304). 
Representatives of the UN development cooperation system often refer to 
capacity development and advising governments as a particular strength of 
the UN agencies in development cooperation (for examples of UN capacity 
development activities see Box 2.2). Official UN documents similarly cite 
capacity development as one of the UN development cooperation system’s 
main tasks and also see it as strength of the UN agencies in this sphere 
(UNDG Executive Committee 2007). Explanations of what specifically 
makes the UN agencies so good at capacity development are not given in this 
context. However, many other bi- and multilateral actors, such as the German 
Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), are active in the field of capacity 
development. It has yet to be clarified whether the UN agencies have a par-
ticular strength in this field.  
No systematic studies capable of revealing the strengths of the UN agencies 
in development cooperation are available. The only empirical source is the 
Multilateral Organizations Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN), 
which carries out non-country-specific studies of the performance of a num-
ber of selected multilateral organisations. 
According to MOPAN, UNDP’s strength lies in its role as advocate for inter-
nationally agreed development issues, in the promotion of policy dialogue in 
partner countries and in capacity development (MOPAN 2005a, 11). Simi-
larly, MOPAN sees UNFPA’s strengths in policy dialogue, primarily in the 
areas of reproductive health, family planning, domestic violence and gender 
issues, in advocacy and policy advice and in the influence these last two fac-
tors have on national policy-making (MOPAN 2005b, 19). 
Unlike its appraisal of UNDP, MOPAN’s findings on UNFPA’s capacity 
development work are mixed: capacity development in the case of public 
institutions (e.g. the development of databases and the training of midwives) 
is deemed to be good, but not one of UNFPA’s strengths in the case of civil-
society or private organisations (MOPAN 2005b, 20). One of its particular 
strengths, on the other hand, lies in involving non-governmental organisa-
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tions (ibid., 18). It is also especially good at using national expertise (ibid., 
20).  
UNICEF is also judged by MOPAN to achieve good results primarily in the 
development of the capacities of public institutions and to be less active in 
the case of private institutions (MOPAN 2006, 8). One of UNICEF’s clear 
strengths, on the other hand, lies in its advocacy for children’s rights at coun-
try level. Numerous positive examples (such as the provision of documents, 
the organisation of events and media presence) are presented to illustrate 
UNICEF’s strength in this area. Apart from these data collected by MOPAN, 
which cannot be applied to the entire UN development cooperation system,38 
there are no empirical studies of the advantages that the UN agencies have 
over other development cooperation actors in capacity development and  
advice.  
The debate on the strengths of the UN agencies in development cooperation 
can be summarised under seven headings: 
1. Universal membership creates special legitimacy for standard-
setting. 
2. Owing to their legitimacy and impartiality, the UN agencies have 
strength in operational work in politically sensitive areas compared 
to other actors. 
3. The UN agencies represent an alternative voice in the development 
sphere. 
4. As a result of their multilateral character, the UN agencies are par-
ticularly close to the developing countries. 
5. Unlike other actors, many UN agencies are represented locally in 
almost every country, even where bilateral relations have been sev-
ered. 
6. The UN agencies have strength in capacity development and in ad-
vising governments. 
                                                          
38  MOPAN has so far appraised only the three Organizations UNDP, UNFPA and UNICEF, 
focusing on the specific work of these agencies. MOPAN’s statements are based on anec-
dotal evidence collected at country level. As the appraisals of the agencies differ from one 
country to another, MOPAN’s findings cannot be regarded as applicable to the work of 
other UN agencies. 
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7. The UN agencies are strong in their advocacy of internationally 
agreed development goals. 
It has so far proved impossible to produce any empirical evidence that the 
UN agencies have any strengths in the areas that involve operational work 
(comprising Point 2, “politically sensitive spheres,” and Point 6, “capacity 
development”). They will have to submit to such scrutiny of their strengths in 
the future.  
The strengths referred to in Points 4 to 7 have implications for the implemen-
tation of the Paris Declaration. The UN agencies might, for example, use 
their strength in capacity development – if empirically confirmed as being  
a strength – in the continued implementation of the Paris Declaration, since 
capacity development is one of its declared objectives. The global presence of 
many UN agencies – especially in countries in which bilateral actors are not 
present – and their closeness to developing countries might also be used to 
enable them to meet their commitments to alignment and capacity develop-
ment. 
The advocacy of the UN agencies might be helpful in the preparation and 
implementation of national development strategies, which is another of the 
goals of the Paris Declaration.  
The strengths summarised in Points 1 to 3 (“standard-setting”, “politically 
sensitive spheres” and “alternative voice”) do not have any direct implica-
tions for the implementation of the Paris Declaration or cannot be used for 
this purpose. 
As regards the implementation of the Paris Declaration, UNDG sees the UN 
agencies as having tasks in three areas (UNDG 2007b, 29): 
1. Assisting partner countries with aid coordination. 
2. Deepening the dialogue on aid effectiveness through the UN agen-
cies’ involvement of various development cooperation actors and 
interest groups. 
3. Capacity development in the use of aid modalities and support for 
aid coordination units, for example. 
As regards Point 1 – aid coordination – representatives of developing coun-
tries, too, point out that the UN agencies, which are perceived as impartial, 
might provide the developing countries with strong aid coordination support 
at country level. A conclusive answer cannot be given here to the question 
The Implementation of the Paris Declaration 
German Development Institute 61 
whether the UN agencies have a particular strength in the promotion of dia-
logue (Point 2) or capacity development in the use of certain aid modalities 
(Point 3).  
Using the UN agencies’ strengths to implement the Paris Declaration is, how-
ever, only a first step, which they must take to meet their commitments.  
Of greater import is the necessary and still pending positioning of the UN 
agencies in the international development cooperation system – on the basis 
of strengths. The following therefore analyses the implications which the 
strengths of the UN agencies will have for their possible positioning in that 
system. 
4.2 Reflections on the future role of the UN agencies in 
the international development cooperation system 
The fragmentation of the international development cooperation system39 
with its various bi- and multilateral and non-governmental actors gives rise to 
considerable transaction costs for partner countries. The Paris Declaration 
therefore calls on donors and international organisations to agree to a division 
of labour in order to reduce transaction costs and to increase aid effectiveness 
(Paris Declaration 2005, 9, paragraph 35). In doing so, the actors should use 
their comparative advantages at country and sector level to complement de-
velopment cooperation efforts and, where appropriate, assign certain activi-
ties and tasks to other donors (ibid.). 
The call for harmonisation voiced in the Paris Declaration thus means the 
possible withdrawal of development cooperation actors from sectors and 
countries where they do not have any comparative advantages. Its call for a 
more effective division of labour consequently forms the goal horizon for the 
                                                          
39  The term “international development cooperation system” covers the form taken by interna-
tional development cooperation with its various actors (donors, developing countries, non-
governmental actors) and aid modalities (budget support, programme-based approaches, 
project funding, etc.). Turner et al. (2003, 1) use the term “international development archi-
tecture,” by which they understand “the world’s agencies, institutions and systems for 
managing the transfer of resources (finance and expertise) to, and development relation-
ships with, low-income countries.” For an overview of the international development coop-
eration system and its possible future structure see Rogerson et al. (2004). 
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future positioning of development cooperation actors in the international 
development cooperation system.40  
The fact that this system is subject to major changes increases the pressure on 
development cooperation actors to find their respective positions. On the one 
hand, the influence of new actors in the international development coopera-
tion system has grown in recent years, examples being private foundations 
and such “new” donors as India and China. On the other hand, greater use is 
being made of such aid modalities as budget support and programme-based 
approaches, driven not least by the Paris Declaration. In this changing devel-
opment cooperation architecture not only the UN agencies but also bilateral 
donors, the EU, the World Bank and the regional banks must ask themselves 
what tasks and what role they are able and willing to take on in operational 
work in the future. 
For the UN development cooperation system this is a particularly pressing 
issue: most UN agencies have only limited financial resources and are there-
fore no match financially for other development cooperation actors. Their 
limited financial endowment also has an effect on the role they play in re-
spect of the two aid modalities that are increasingly being used, budget sup-
port and sector programmes. The UN agencies cannot and should not – ac-
cording to many UN donors – “buy their way” into participation in these aid 
modalities. If, however, they are unable to assure themselves of a place at the 
donor table with their financial contributions, the question is what added 
value they have to offer in this context.  
If the UN agencies do not want to run the risk of being overtaken by the 
changes to the development cooperation architecture and marginalised by 
other (financially better endowed and therefore more influential) actors, they 
must build on their strengths and sharpen their image – to distinguish them-
selves from other development cooperation actors – and put across clearly 
their (possible) role in the international development cooperation system. 
In the past various models have been presented for the re-structuring and 
positioning of the UN development cooperation system. Messner et al. 
                                                          
40  In May 2007 the EU, for example, adopted a code of conduct relating to complementarity 
and the division of labour in development policy, under which each EU Member State and 
the Commission will concentrate on a maximum of three sectors in any country and will 
appoint a lead donor for each sector. 
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(2005), for example, want to upgrade the position of the UN development 
cooperation system by creating a Council for Global Development and Envi-
ronment and so to tie the Bretton Woods Institutions and the WTO more 
closely to the UN development cooperation system. The latter would then 
become the main actor in the development sphere (ibid., 18ff.) 
The Dutch government has proposed a three-pillar model in which the many 
UN agencies would be subordinated to UN Agencies for Development, the 
Environment and Humanitarian Assistance according to their respective areas 
of responsibility (OECD/DAC 2005a). This consolidation of the UN institu-
tional landscape would thus give rise to three UN agencies, which would 
perform the operational work. The specialised agencies would remain in 
existence and perform normative work only. As early as 1996 the Nordic UN 
Project defined the long-term goal of having a single UN development 
agency (Nordic UN Project 1996, 12). In a discussion paper in 2006 the 
BMZ, too, advocated a “single integrated system of UN operational devel-
opment cooperation” (BMZ 2006, 3), with UN development and environ-
ment agencies being amalgamated to form a “sustainable development clus-
ter” in an intermediate stage (ibid.).  
Kloke-Lesch et al. (2006) similarly propose the strengthening of the role of 
the UN development cooperation system in operational work through the 
establishment of a single operational UN development cooperation unit. The 
UN agencies’ operational work in the areas of economic and social develop-
ment, human rights, the environment, governance, the development of peace 
and humanitarian assistance should accordingly be performed by a single 
entity. The Belgian government also sees a single consolidated UN Devel-
opment Agency as the ideal future model for the re-structuring of UN devel-
opment cooperation (OECD/DAC 2005b). 
However, none of these reform models asks what role the UN agencies 
should play in the international development cooperation system on the basis 
of their strengths. Instead, they merely propose that the existing UN institu-
tional landscape should be consolidated, but retain the various areas of activ-
ity in their all-embracing totality. As none of the models asks in what areas 
the UN agencies have strengths, none develops a reform model on that basis. 
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Nor does the report of the High-level Panel say how the UN agencies should 
position themselves in the development cooperation system in the future.41 
The possibility of the UN development cooperation system playing a role in 
the application of such new aid modalities as Sector-wide Approaches 
(SWAps) and budget support has so far been considered only by a Scanteam 
study of one case (2005). According to this, the UN agencies’ strength lies in 
assisting partner governments with the use of budget support by advising 
them and developing their capacities and in influencing the preparation of 
sector programmes through advocacy for certain development issues (ibid.). 
A UNDG position paper on the role of the UN development cooperation 
system in sector programmes (UNDG 2005c) maintains that it is not financial 
contributions that determine the participation of the UN agencies in a sector 
programme. They should instead contribute their expertise to the planning 
and implementation of a sector programme (ibid.). In addition, the UN agen-
cies should assist partner countries with the implementation of such aid mo-
dalities as budget support and basket/pooled funding through capacity devel-
opment, services in the areas of administration and management of donor 
funds, etc. 
As most UN agencies have only limited financial resources at their disposal, 
advising governments and developing capacities in this way would also be 
the only opportunity for UN agencies to position themselves with respect to 
these aid modalities and to distinguish themselves from other development 
cooperation actors. 
A criticism that must be voiced in this context, however, is that, apart from 
the MOPAN studies referred to above, only the UN agencies themselves have 
so far claimed strength in capacity development. Nor has it been shown that 
the UN agencies have particular expertise in advising on the use of these new 
aid modalities, such as budget support in the area of public financial admini-
stration.  
                                                          
41  The terms of reference for the HLP report explicitly define the task at hand as follows: “It 
[the study] will also need to address how the UN system works and can best exercise its 
comparative advantages with international partners, including the Bretton Woods Institu-
tions, the European Commission and other regional actors, donors, civil society and the 
private sector” (HLP 2006, 56). 
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Moreover, the analysis in Part 2 of this study has shown that, in some cases, 
the qualifications of UN staff at country level do not yet comply with the “job 
specifications” for advising governments or capacity development. Further 
reforms would therefore be needed if the UN agencies were to seek their 
place in the budget support/sector programme area. 
To summarise, it can be said that the question whether, in their operational 
work, the UN agencies have strengths in certain sectors has yet to be an-
swered. Nor do they necessarily have any strength, compared to other actors, 
in politically sensitive areas, such as governance and human rights or in 
(post-)conflict situations. Depending on the country context, other actors, too, 
may have strengths in these areas, perhaps owing to particular experience in a 
country/sector or to close bilateral relations due to historical circumstances.  
In general, the debate on a division of labour based on strengths is highly 
complex. Menocal et al. (2006, 16f.) point out that a development coopera-
tion actor’s comparative advantage is due to five main factors: its mandate, 
its capacities/know-how/expertise, its cost structure (cost effectiveness), its 
record (successes and failures) and – a “soft” determinant – its partner’s trust. 
As the interplay between these factors is complex, different development 
cooperation actors may have a particular strength, depending on the country 
or the sector involved. Consequently, these strengths are relative, not absolute 
(ibid.).  
The question whether the UN agencies should withdraw from operational 
areas in which they may have no apparent strength remains open. A debate on 
this aspect should be conducted on the basis of empirical studies in an unbi-
ased way. It should be pointed out at this juncture that not only the UN agen-
cies but all bi- and multilateral actors must submit to a discussion and analy-
sis of their respective strengths. If the Paris Declaration is to be implemented 
and the more effective division of labour for which it calls is to be achieved, 
none of its signatories can evade this process. 
The position of the UN agencies can be determined only if clear mandates are 
handed down and serious structural problems are solved, the latter possibly 
through the standardisation of governance structures. This, however, will 
require intergovernmental decisions by the member states at central level. At 
this level, however, intergovernmental processes of negotiation in New York 
on the reform of the UN’s development cooperation are currently very diffi-
cult because of the politicisation of the debates and the confrontation between 
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the donors (industrialised countries) who support the UN agencies and the 
developing and newly industrialising countries forming the Group of 77 
(G77). If these decision-making processes are so difficult, the question aris-
ing at this stage is how capable of reform the UN agencies can in fact be if 
the newly industrialising and developing countries continue to adopt an ob-
structive attitude.42 
In the past the G77 have been very reluctant when it came to implementing 
major reforms, and in the current intergovernmental discussions on the report 
of the High-level Panel the G77’s critical attitude towards reforms is again in 
evidence. The amalgamation of the Executive Boards of UNDP/UNFPA, 
UNICEF and WFP to form a Sustainable Development Board, as proposed by 
the Panel, cannot, for example, be achieved at present because of the G77’s 
opposition.  
The most serious obstacle is formed by a number of strong opinion-leaders 
within the G77 – predominantly newly industrialising countries – who are 
engaging in power politics through these intergovernmental negotiations. The 
small developing countries, which would benefit from a more coherent and 
more effective UN development cooperation, are particularly unable to assert 
themselves in the G77’s internal opinion-forming. 
Given that the actors involved (industrialised and developing countries) have 
clearly been aware of the UN development cooperation system’s weaknesses 
for decades – numerous analyses of the problems and proposals for reforms 
have been produced43 – and that the implementation of reforms has in fact 
been prevented by power politics, the question still to be answered concerns 
the general prospects for the reform of the UN development cooperation 
system. 
In the continuing process of reform the BMZ will have various opportunities 
to support the positioning and strengthening of the UN agencies in the inter-
                                                          
42  The Group of 77, the association of the developing and newly industrialising countries at 
the UN, currently has a membership of about 130 countries. In intergovernmental decision-
making processes the approval of the G77 is essential, since they usually vote as one and a 
majority can be found only with their consent. 
43  The proposal for the establishment of a single supervisory body for the funds and pro-
grammes was put forward as long ago as 1977 in Resolution 32/197 of the General Assem-
bly. The recommendation was discussed inconclusively at intergovernmental level for some 
years and then disappeared from the agenda once again. 
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national development cooperation system and to attempt to have a positive 
influence on the politicised intergovernmental process. This is discussed in 
the following and final part of this study. 
5 Taking stock and recommendations for positions 
to be adopted by the BMZ 
The appraisal of accessible documents and the interviews with UN staff re-
veal that the process of reform in the UN development cooperation system 
which has been continuing since the late 1990s complements the goals of the 
Paris Declaration. The UN development cooperation system is at pains to 
conform by means of reforms to the new consensus in development coopera-
tion that postulates more harmonisation and alignment. In general, however, 
UN reforms are still too inward in their focus and have few links to other 
donors and actors. All in all, further steps need to be taken in order to enable 
the UN development cooperation system to meet the commitments arising for 
it from the Paris Declaration and in order to position the system according to 
its strengths in the international aid architecture.  
For the following recommendations three levels of action are defined for the 
BMZ: Weaknesses inherent in the UN development cooperation system 
should be addressed by means of demands voiced through the Executive 
Boards. There are also weaknesses whose elimination the BMZ can support 
by providing financial resources. In addition, the German government should 
review its own conduct as a donor in some areas with a view to tackling 
weaknesses due to incoherent conduct towards the UN agencies. 
However, the BMZ can act only within the limits of its competence for cer-
tain UN agencies. In matters that concern the entire UN development coop-
eration system, e.g. funding issues, the BMZ must advocate the adoption of 
certain positions within the German government. This aspect will be dis-
cussed in greater depth later. Table 5.1 summarises the analysis and ap-
proaches which the BMZ might adopt. 
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Boards 
Within the German government the BMZ has overall competence for the four 
UN agencies UNDP, UNFPA, WFP and UNIDO and is thus able to influence 
their work through their Executive Boards. It is at this level that the BMZ 
should endeavour to address the weaknesses which need to be tackled in 
these agencies themselves. The following considers three issues that should 
have priority in this context: 
First, the call for systematic monitoring of progress should have top priority. 
As the UN agencies do not monitor the implementation of the Paris Declara-
tion,44 it is difficult to make systematic statements on the progress being 
made in this regard. For effective monitoring there needs to be compulsory 
communication between headquarters and country level. Evaluation findings 
can then influence work at country level – in the form of guides, for exam-
ple.45  
Second, the UN agencies should coordinate their activities more closely with 
those of other donors and increasingly conduct joint missions and analyses. 
They should now go beyond intra-UN harmonisation and join cross-donor 
initiatives, such as the Joint Assistance Strategies. 
Third, through the Executive Boards the BMZ should initiate a debate on the 
positioning of the UN agencies within the international development coopera-
tion system. The agencies have not yet defined their role with respect to the 
changing development cooperation architecture, but have hitherto focused 
solely on internal reform processes. They should position themselves accord-
ing to their strengths. Of greatest importance in this context are their (alleged) 
strengths as impartial actors and advocates for internationally agreed devel-
opment goals and their (alleged) strengths in capacity development and advis-
ing governments. Provided that they can be proved to exist, these strengths 
could be used in the preparation of sector programmes, in budget manage-
ment and in aid coordination at country level. 
The BMZ should – together with other countries from the North and South – 
refer to the still outstanding positioning at meetings of the Executive Boards 
                                                          
44  The World Bank is excluded in this context (see World Bank 2006). 
45  The major role played by an organised exchange between headquarters and country level is 
also emphasised by De Renzio 2005. 
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of UNDP/UNFPA, WFP and UNIDO and also develop ideas of its own on 
the possible definition of positions. 
The BMZ should also press for greater harmonisation of business practices 
through the Executive Boards of UNDP/UNFPA, WFP and UNIDO. The 
above analysis has made it clear that the improvement of cooperation within 
the UN development cooperation system is often thwarted by differences in 
business practices and operational requirements (see also UNDG Executive 
Committee 2007, 7). The UNDG Executive Committee proposes, for exam-
ple, that a joint fieldwork manual should be compiled (ibid.). 
Similarly, the incentive systems of the various UN agencies, which are still 
heavily focused on the positioning of the agencies, should be changed 
through the Executive Boards. UN staff should be rewarded for their advo-
cacy of UN-wide objectives and their coordination with other organisations. 
On the basis of the (alleged) strength of a number of UN agencies in capacity 
development and advising partners the BMZ should call at Executive Board 
meetings for the agencies to do more to promote capacity development in 
their country programmes. The country systems are often identified as being 
too weak and are consequently not used by donors. Yet this in particular 
represents a good opportunity for UN development cooperation for capacity 
development. 
If effective use is to be made of the Executive Boards as a platform for ac-
tion, it is important that the BMZ joins with other member states to form a 
sufficient majority for the initiatives referred to above to be implemented. 
Possible partners of the North are, apart from the EU partners, Switzerland, 
Norway and Canada. The eight One UN pilot countries and other countries 
known only unofficially to be applying for pilot country status can be re-
garded as reform-friendly countries of the South. 
The BMZ can put forward these proposals only in the Executive Boards of 
agencies for which it has overall competence (UNDP/UNFPA, WFP and 
UNIDO). The other appropriate German government departments will have 
to take a stand in the Executive Boards and supervisory bodies of all other 
funds, programmes and specialised agencies. 
 Martina Vatterodt 
74 German Development Institute 
Germany’s own conduct as a donor 
An essential prerequisite for coherent UN development cooperation is a 
coherent donor conduct towards the UN agencies. Like many other donors, 
however, the German government does not speak with one voice to the UN 
agencies active in development cooperation. Competences for the various 
funds, programmes and specialised agencies are distributed among various 
government departments. Coordination among the departments occurs to only 
a limited extent. The coordination between the Foreign Office (competent for 
UNICEF and UNESCO) and the BMZ in the case of reform issues affecting 
the competences of both departments works well, however. 
In contrast to the frequent exchanges between the BMZ and the Foreign Of-
fice, however, there are no regular exchanges between the BMZ (competent 
for UNDP, UNFPA, UNIFEM, WFP, UNIDO, the World Bank Group, the 
regional banks and the International Fund for Agricultural Development – 
IFAD), the Ministry of Health (competent for WHO), the Ministry of Agri-
culture (competent for FAO), the Ministry for the Environment (competent 
for UNEP), the Employment Ministry (competent for ILO) and the Family 
Ministry (competent for normative gender equality issues in the UN system). 
It must generally be assumed that Germany’s UN policy could be made far 
more coherent and that the time and money spent on coordination within the 
German government would be greatly reduced if overall responsibility for the 
UN agencies active in the development sphere was assigned to the BMZ 
alone (see Fues 2006). One criterion in this context might be, for example, 
the extent to which contributions to the agencies count as ODA. The BMZ 
would then be competent for all UN funds, programmes and specialised 
agencies receiving contributions more than 50 % of which counted as ODA 
as defined by the OECD criteria. Currently, 100 % of contributions to UNI-
CEF (for which the Foreign Office is competent), 70 % of contributions to 
WHO (for which the Ministry of Health is competent) and 51 % of contribu-
tions to FAO (for which the Ministry of Agriculture is competent) count as 
ODA. A rearrangement of government portfolios to reflect the extent to 
which contributions to the UN agencies count as ODA is to be recommended. 
An important intermediate stage on the road to a more coherent German UN 
policy should be the institutionalisation of coordination among the aforemen-
tioned government departments under the BMZ’s chairmanship.  
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This might take the form, for example, of a regular meeting of the depart-
ments for a discussion of issues requiring a uniform German position, such as 
the implementation of the Paris Declaration. In particular, meetings of the 
Executive Boards to which the various departments send representatives 
should be preceded by consultation of all the departments concerned on the 
issues to be considered, so that a uniform negotiating line can be agreed.  
The departments should adopt a uniform position on fundamental aspects of 
system-wide coherence, such as the introduction of joint country programmes 
and joint Executive Board meetings. This coordination worked well when it 
came to the government’s position on the report of the High-level Panel. If, 
however, predominantly reactive coordination in specific, short-term matters 
is to give way to a coherent German UN policy, the BMZ’s competence for 
the development cooperation sphere should be expanded and it should be 
assigned a clear coordinating role.  
Furthermore, the formulation of a German multilateral strategy along the 
lines of the all-of-government approach proposed in the HLP report is to be 
recommended. Among other things, this would mean adopting the aforemen-
tioned uniform position on questions of system-wide coherence. A German 
multilateral strategy of this kind might also entail agreement among the de-
partments concerned on what they expect from the UN agencies in the devel-
opment sphere, where they see the agencies’ strengths and how they will gear 
their funding to their expectations in the long term.  
To place UN development cooperation on an improved financial footing 
(multi-year commitments and more core resources), the BMZ should call on 
the German government to abide by principles of good multilateral donor-
ship. For Germany’s conduct as a donor this would mean the BMZ and all 
other departments with competence for UN agencies urging the Ministry of 
Finance to enable them to enter into multi-year commitments for the UN 
funds and programmes. This would entail in particular a dialogue with the 
German parliament, since multi-year commitments are possible only with its 
approval. Without such commitments Indicator 7 of the Paris Declaration 
cannot be accomplished. It is hard to accept that Germany can make multi-
year commitments to the World Bank, but not yet to the funds and pro-
grammes. 
Good multilateral donorship principles might also mean donors making con-
tributions mainly to the core resources of the UN development cooperation 
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system and refraining from small-scale, earmarked funding, which forces the 
UN agencies to adopt project-based approaches. Germany already pays most 
of its contributions to the UN development cooperation system in a non-
earmarked form. In conjunction with other donors, Germany might press for 
an end to the practice – much employed by a number of donors – of increas-
ing earmarked contributions46 and for a commitment by donors to a rise in 
their contributions to core resources. In shared principles of good multilateral 
donorship the donors might advocate the setting of an upper limit on ear-
marked funding as a proportion of total contributions.  
Payments by Germany and other donors into core resources and the possible 
introduction of multi-year commitments should be linked by the donors to 
clear demands addressed to the UN agencies. The German government – 
along with other countries – should, for example, press in the UN agencies’ 
supervisory bodies for the commitments arising from the Paris Declaration to 
be met. 
Germany’s conduct as a donor, especially towards the UN funds and pro-
grammes, should be improved in the long term, with good multilateral donor-
ship as the goal. In the case of compulsory contributions to the UN budget 
and the UN specialised agencies, Germany’s economic strength is such that it 
is usually the third largest contributor after the USA and Japan. In terms of 
total voluntary contributions to the funds and programmes, on the other hand, 
Germany is well behind other major donors. If in the long term German vol-
untary contributions are to be increased in the form of multi-year commit-
ments, a dialogue with the German parliament is important. The BMZ should 
reinforce this dialogue. 
Funding options 
The weaknesses in implementation create opportunities for the funding of 
innovative reform measures by the BMZ. Such bilateral funding of (partial) 
reforms would take the form of earmarked contributions (non-core resources) 
to the UN development cooperation system. Along with many other donors, 
the BMZ contributes to the UN Country Coordination Fund (UNCCF), which 
is administered by DGO. The UNCCF consists of earmarked contributions 
from donors, which are used to finance measures that promote closer coop-
                                                          
46  For an empirical study of the determinants of donors’ conduct towards multilateral organi-
sations see Addison et al. 2003. 
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eration within the UN development cooperation system at country level, e.g. 
advice given to UNCTs by UNDG on the establishment of Joint Programmes 
and UNDG’s compilation of appropriate guides. 
Table 5.1 indicates weaknesses in the implementation of the Paris Declara-
tion that might be overcome by funding of this kind. DGO could continue to 
use donors’ contributions to the UNCCF to fund advisory activities under-
taken to tackle these weaknesses, such as the training of UNCTs for the more 
strategic formulation of UNDAFs and assistance with the preparation of pur-
poseful staff development strategies and the analysis of the problem of paral-
lel project implementation units. Recently, for example, the guide to the 
preparation of CCAs/UNDAFs was brought up to date through DGO, with 
funding from the UNCCF, and is now more closely attuned to the situation of 
UNCTs at country level (UNDG 2007a). 
This recommendation that (partial) reforms in the UN development coopera-
tion system be financed bilaterally by donors paying into appropriate funds 
has, however, proved to be controversial. The reason for this is that a reform 
designed to make UN development cooperation more effective should be a 
fundamental commitment officially recognised by the UN system with its 
acceptance of the Paris Declaration. As such reforms thus belong among the 
core tasks of the UN development cooperation system, they should be funded 
from core resources and not with earmarked contributions from individual 
donors. Bilateral funding of innovative reform measures by the BMZ would 
also be inconsistent with the recommendation made in the previous section 
that contributions to core resources should be increased and earmarked fund-
ing should cease. 
In addition, funding of reform measures by donors might result in the UN 
agencies losing credibility for appearing to be incapable of performing their 
fundamental tasks on their own. There would also be a danger of the UN 
development cooperation system accepting less ownership for its own re-
forms if they were funded by third parties. The question that therefore arises 
is how sustainable such measures would be if the donors stopped giving their 
support.  
Despite this criticism of the bilateral funding of (partial) reforms, the BMZ is 
recommended at this stage to continue its payments to the UNCCF and so to 
make funds available for any further reforms that become necessary. The 
justification for this is that all the reforms described in Chapter 2.4 have been 
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undertaken only since UNDG was established and DGO began giving advice. 
It was only through UNDG’s and DGO’s work that the practical implementa-
tion of reform measures and the advising of UNCTs became possible. UNDG 
and DGO were the driving forces in the reform process within the UN devel-
opment cooperation system, and with their reform measures they have 
sparked a major positive reform momentum, on which the recommendations 
made in the HLP report are based.  
Before the establishment of UNDG and without the donor-financed funds 
hardly any reforms were seriously undertaken until the late 1990s.47 Hitherto 
coordination and coherence within the UN system have been the responsibil-
ity of the Chief Executives Board (CEB). In the CEB the heads of all UN 
agencies active in the development field in the wider sense of the term meet 
twice a year at the invitation of the UN Secretary-General. However, none of 
the opinions so far published by the CEB has set any store by improved op-
erational work. Practical support for progress towards One UN at country 
level has come primarily from UNDG and DGO, as in the case of the intro-
duction of the UNDAF and such major reforms as the Joint Office initiative. 
One reason for the absence of major reforms until the late 1990s is that it was 
only when the funds overseen by DGO were set up that money became avail-
able to finance such action. Major reforms require substantial human and 
other resources, for which the UN agencies have to pay from their core re-
sources. This would mean all the UN agencies having to plan for them in 
their budgets. So far the coordination among the various supervisory bodies 
has not even gone far enough to allow agreement on joint country pro-
grammes to be reached. Moreover, the developing countries, which form the 
majority in the supervisory bodies, want to see the limited resources going 
straight to the country programmes rather being spent on reform measures. 
It would therefore be utopian at present to assume that the funding of major 
reforms could be organised through a dozen different core budgets. For the 
practical implementation of reforms DGO has therefore been entirely de-
pendent on donor-financed funds endowed with earmarked resources, such as 
the UNCCF. 
                                                          
47  The only exception was the establishment of UNDP. In 1965 the Expanded Programme of 
Technical Assistance (EPTA) and the Special Fund were combined and UNDP was created 
under Resolution 2029 (XX) of the General Assembly. 
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This problem is also the cause of the main weakness of the RC system: in 
many countries the fact that the RC is simultaneously the senior UNDP repre-
sentative prevents the other UN agencies from having the necessary confi-
dence in UNDP’s coordinating role. Although the senior UNDP representa-
tive – and RC – has hitherto been mandated to coordinate the work of the UN 
agencies, it is evident from the actual situation at country level that some of 
the other UN agencies do not trust him or her to carry out the coordinating 
work. 
The conclusions drawn from years of practical work at country level thus 
indicate that the weakness inherent in this duality of roles can be overcome 
only if UNDP finances two posts: that of a UNDP country director and that of 
an RC. This would affect all countries with extensive country programmes 
entailing a great deal of coordination, the situation facing UNDP in 40 coun-
tries. Posts for 30 country directors have already been created, and a further 
ten are now to be filled (UNDG Executive Committee 2007). Each UNDP 
country director post is estimated to cost some 300,000 US$.48 
So far UNDP has financed 14 posts from its own budget. Whether or not 
further posts will be financed in this way cannot be said at the moment, since 
a majority of the UNDP Executive Board members would currently not be in 
favour. As all the UN agencies benefit from the work of the RC, the shared 
funding of his post by a dozen core budgets would seem appropriate, but 
impossible in practice owing to the absence of agreement among the supervi-
sory bodies. 
To press on with what is seen by the UN agencies in the field as a very posi-
tive reform, UNDP is therefore canvassing the donors for earmarked contri-
butions to finance further UNDP country director posts. The BMZ is also 
participating and has promised to fund six UNDP country directors. This 
funding should continue, because it is currently the only way this reform can 
be sustained.  
It follows from the approach to reforms described above by reference to the 
work of UNDG/DGO and the creation of the UNDP country director posts 
that certain reforms cannot be undertaken unless appropriate (earmarked) 
resources are provided. This funding has created a positive reform momen-
tum, driving practical action in the UN system that has been perceived by all 
                                                          
48  This covers salary and all other current (administrative) costs. 
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the agencies involved and by the partner countries as giving rise to a clear 
improvement of UN development cooperation.49 It may also significantly 
increase the pace of reform, since years of intergovernmental discussions 
would not produce a decision. Earmarked donor funding of selected reform 
measures is therefore recommended at this stage.  
A similar situation is apparent from the implementation of the One UN initia-
tive that is now under way: The necessary restructuring of the work of the 
UN agencies in the countries concerned is impossible without the support of 
financial/human resources. For donors – including the BMZ – this again 
provides an opportunity to provide the necessary resources to sustain the 
current reform dynamic in those countries. To demonstrate that Germany is 
interested in seeing UN development cooperation strengthened along the 
lines of One UN, the BMZ should consider providing additional funds as 
pump-priming finance for the pilot countries. 
For the intergovernmental discussions on the HLP report and all other re-
forms it will be crucially important for the pilot country initiative to be a 
demonstrable success, as it will then create further positive reform momen-
tum. There is therefore an urgent need for an independent evaluation of the 
pilot country initiatives as a source of substantiated data on whether or not 
these measures have improved the work of UN development cooperation. 
Should this be the case, the critics on the Executive Boards might be per-
suaded to approve the reforms for One UN at country level, to adopt amend-
ments to the guidelines and to provide the necessary financing of the reforms 
from core resources. 
To counter the criticism that, being donor-funded, these reforms would be 
donor-dominated and serve only to save money for UN development coop-
eration in the long term by increasing the efficiency of operational work, the 
donors should raise not only their earmarked funding of reforms but also their 
untied contributions (see the recommendation above). This would be a clear 
sign of support for the strengthening of UN development cooperation. 
Owing to the ambivalence of the earmarked funding of reform measures, the 
BMZ – together with other donors – should point out in the supervisory bod-
ies whenever earmarked funds are used to finance reform measures that they 
are intended as pump-priming funds. On the one hand, this will be a clear 
                                                          
49  See all the positively rated reforms described in Chapter 2.4. 
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sign that practical reforms will be undertaken. On the other hand, Germany 
should, however, insist that, where certain measures are rated positively, the 
UN agencies must be able to make funds available from core resources for 
further action. Earmarked funds should therefore be disbursed for only a 
limited period, with contributions possibly even declining each year in order 
not to permanently finance a coordination machinery within the UN devel-
opment cooperation system.  
In the knowledge that reforms are tough in practice, this recommendation is 
thus based on the pragmatic handling of UN reforms: as this has so far been 
the only way in UN reforms to make progress towards greater effectiveness, 
this route should continue to be followed for the time being to take advantage 
of the current reform momentum and to press ahead with changes. 
Positioning in the negotiations on the High-level Panel (HLP) report 
In the negotiations on the HLP report the BMZ should advocate within the 
German government that the Panel’s proposals be endorsed, since they are 
consistent with the Paris Declaration targets. The proposals for a strengthened 
RC system and One UN at country level in particular may lead to further 
harmonisation within the UN development cooperation system. The German 
government should support the pilot countries and an up-to-date evaluation of 
these initiatives,50 possibly financially, but certainly politically.  
During the negotiations it should be ensured that all reforms take account of 
the alignment principle. Particular attention should also be paid to the pro-
posals for a uniform UN-wide evaluation system, since it could put an end to 
the practice of each Executive Board insisting on its own monitoring and 
reporting rules for country programmes. As the HLP report does not single 
out the “mutual accountability” dimension for discussion, the BMZ should 
draw attention to it in the continuing reform debate. 
The High-level Panel’s proposal that reform-friendly UN agencies should be 
rewarded with the complete funding of their core resources should be sup-
                                                          
50  If there are to be further reforms, it will be extremely important to determine whether the 
pilot country initiative has led to a significant improvement in UN work at country level. 
Should this be the case, advocates of reform would have a strong argument for more exten-
sive reforms. 
 Martina Vatterodt 
82 German Development Institute 
ported by the German government.51 The reason for this is that, as UN staff 
point out, the absence of an incentive system for reforms and closer coopera-
tion among the UN agencies is a major obstacle resulting in little progress 
being made in these areas.52  
The German government should openly refute the developing countries’ 
criticism that the sole purpose of the proposals for greater harmonisation is to 
reduce donor contributions to the UN agencies. The High-level Panel’s pro-
posal that any resources saved as a result of reforms should again be made 
available to the UN agencies should therefore be endorsed. If they are to 
perform an incentive function, however, it is important that savings achieved 
at country level remain in the countries where the savings were achieved. 
In view of the difficult intergovernmental negotiating situation it is important 
for the German government to enter into a dialogue with developing coun-
tries interested in reforms and to form a reform-friendly North-South alliance. 
Potential partners in the South are the One UN pilot countries and other, still 
unofficial candidates for pilot country status. To create trust, the BMZ should 
emphasise interests that North and South have in common, such as the goal of 
not using reforms purely to reduce costs and that of developing the UN agen-
cies into strong development cooperation actors.  
As the High-level Panel’s proposals are exclusively focused on intra-UN 
harmonisation, the German government should advocate during the negotia-
tions that the UN agencies harmonise even more closely with other donors. 
This is important if the UN development cooperation system is not to be 
impeded and eventually marginalised by taking an excessively inward view. 
This will require an analysis of the strengths of the UN agencies within the 
international development cooperation system.  
The implementation of the proposals set out in the HLP report and purposeful 
support for efforts to overcome the weaknesses identified in this study may 
help the UN development cooperation system as it moves towards more ef-
fective development cooperation. The German government’s support is an 
important element in this reform process. It should be the aim of all reforms 
                                                          
51  Details of this proposal for a reform still need to be clarified. It is not clear, for example, 
what is meant by “complete” funding of core resources. 
52  For the major role played by incentive systems in development cooperation agencies’ 
harmonisation and alignment processes see De Renzio 2005. 
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to position the UN development cooperation within the development coop-
eration architecture – on the basis of its strengths – in a way that it makes a 
major contribution to the achievement of the MDGs. 
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P A R I S  D E C L A R A T I O N  O N  A I D  E F F E C T I V E N E S S  
O w n e r s h i p ,  H a r m o n i s a t i o n ,  A l i g n m e n t ,  R e s u l t s  
a n d  M u t u a l  A c c o u n t a b i l i t y  
I .  S t a t e m e n t  o f  R e s o l v e  
1. We, Ministers of developed and developing countries responsible for promoting development and 
Heads of multilateral and bilateral development institutions, meeting in Paris on 2 March 2005, resolve to take 
far-reaching and monitorable actions to reform the ways we deliver and manage aid as we look ahead to the UN 
five-year review of the Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) later this year. 
As in Monterrey, we recognise that while the volumes of aid and other development resources must increase to 
achieve these goals, aid effectiveness must increase significantly as well to support partner country efforts to 
strengthen governance and improve development performance. This will be all the more important if existing 
and new bilateral and multilateral initiatives lead to significant further increases in aid. 
2. At this High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, we followed up on the Declaration adopted at the 
High-Level Forum on Harmonisation in Rome (February 2003) and the core principles put forward at the 
Marrakech Roundtable on Managing for Development Results (February 2004) because we believe they will 
increase the impact aid has in reducing poverty and inequality, increasing growth, building capacity and 
accelerating achievement of the MDGs.  
Scale up for more effective aid 
3. We reaffirm the commitments made at Rome to harmonise and align aid delivery. We are encouraged 
that many donors and partner countries are making aid effectiveness a high priority, and we reaffirm our 
commitment to accelerate progress in implementation, especially in the following areas: 
i. Strengthening partner countries’ national development strategies and associated operational 
frameworks (e.g., planning, budget, and performance assessment frameworks). 
ii. Increasing alignment of aid with partner countries’ priorities, systems and procedures and helping to 
strengthen their capacities. 
iii. Enhancing donors’ and partner countries’ respective accountability to their citizens and parliaments for 
their development policies, strategies and performance. 
iv. Eliminating duplication of efforts and rationalising donor activities to make them as cost-effective as 
possible. 
v. Reforming and simplifying donor policies and procedures to encourage collaborative behaviour and 
progressive alignment with partner countries’ priorities, systems and procedures. 
vi. Defining measures and standards of performance and accountability of partner country systems in 
public financial management, procurement, fiduciary safeguards and environmental assessments, in line 
with broadly accepted good practices and their quick and widespread application. 
4. We commit ourselves to taking concrete and effective action to address the remaining challenges, 
including:  
i. Weaknesses in partner countries’ institutional capacities to develop and implement results-driven 
national development strategies.  
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ii. Failure to provide more predictable and multi-year commitments on aid flows to committed partner 
countries. 
iii. Insufficient delegation of authority to donors’ field staff, and inadequate attention to incentives for 
effective development partnerships between donors and partner countries. 
iv. Insufficient integration of global programmes and initiatives into partner countries’ broader 
development agendas, including in critical areas such as HIV/AIDS. 
v. Corruption and lack of transparency, which erode public support, impede effective resource 
mobilisation and allocation and divert resources away from activities that are vital for poverty 
reduction and sustainable economic development. Where corruption exists, it inhibits donors from 
relying on partner country systems. 
5. We acknowledge that enhancing the effectiveness of aid is feasible and necessary across all aid 
modalities. In determining the most effective modalities of aid delivery, we will be guided by development 
strategies and priorities established by partner countries. Individually and collectively, we will choose and design 
appropriate and complementary modalities so as to maximise their combined effectiveness. 
6. In following up the Declaration, we will intensify our efforts to provide and use development 
assistance, including the increased flows as promised at Monterrey, in ways that rationalise the often excessive 
fragmentation of donor activities at the country and sector levels.  
Adapt and apply to differing country situations 
7. Enhancing the effectiveness of aid is also necessary in challenging and complex situations, such as the 
tsunami disaster that struck countries of the Indian Ocean rim on 26 December 2004. In such situations, 
worldwide humanitarian and development assistance must be harmonised within the growth and poverty 
reduction agendas of partner countries. In fragile states, as we support state-building and delivery of basic 
services, we will ensure that the principles of harmonisation, alignment and managing for results are adapted to 
environments of weak governance and capacity. Overall, we will give increased attention to such complex 
situations as we work toward greater aid effectiveness. 
Specify indicators, timetable and targets 
8. We accept that the reforms suggested in this Declaration will require continued high-level political 
support, peer pressure and coordinated actions at the global, regional and country levels. We commit to 
accelerate the pace of change by implementing, in a spirit of mutual accountability, the Partnership 
Commitments presented in Section II and to measure progress against 12 specific indicators that we have agreed 
today and that are set out in Section III of this Declaration.  
9. As a further spur to progress, we will set targets for the year 2010. These targets, which will involve 
action by both donors and partner countries, are designed to track and encourage progress at the global level 
among the countries and agencies that have agreed to this Declaration. They are not intended to prejudge or 
substitute for any targets that individual partner countries may wish to set. We have agreed today to set five 
preliminary targets against indicators as shown in Section III. We agree to review these preliminary targets and to 
adopt targets against the remaining indicators as shown in Section III before the UNGA Summit in September 
2005; and we ask the partnership of donors and partner countries hosted by the DAC to prepare for this 
urgently1. Meanwhile, we welcome initiatives by partner countries and donors to establish their own targets for 
                                                     
1 In accordance with paragraph 9 of the Declaration, the partnership of donors and partner countries hosted by 
the DAC (Working Party on Aid Effectiveness) comprising OECD/DAC members, partner countries and 
multilateral institutions, met twice, on 30-31 May 2005 and on 7-8 July 2005 to adopt, and review where 
appropriate, the targets for the twelve Indicators of Progress. At these meetings an agreement was reached on the 
targets presented under Section III of the present Declaration. This agreement is subject to reservations by one 
donor on (a) the methodology for assessing the quality of locally-managed procurement systems (relating to 
targets 2b and 5b) and (b) the acceptable quality of public financial management reform programmes (relating to 
target 5a.ii). Further discussions are underway to address these issues. The targets, including the reservation, have 
been notified to the Chairs of the High-level Plenary Meeting of the 59th General Assembly of the United 
Nations in a letter of 9 September 2005 by Mr. Richard Manning, Chair of the OECD Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC). 
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improved aid effectiveness within the framework of the agreed Partnership Commitments and Indicators of 
Progress. For example, a number of partner countries have presented action plans, and a large number of donors 
have announced important new commitments. We invite all participants who wish to provide information on 
such initiatives to submit it by 4 April 2005 for subsequent publication. 
Monitor and evaluate implementation 
10. Because demonstrating real progress at country level is critical, under the leadership of the partner 
country we will periodically assess, qualitatively as well as quantitatively, our mutual progress at country level in 
implementing agreed commitments on aid effectiveness. In doing so, we will make use of appropriate country 
level mechanisms. 
11. At the international level, we call on the partnership of donors and partner countries hosted by the 
DAC to broaden partner country participation and, by the end of 2005, to propose arrangements for the 
medium term monitoring of the commitments in this Declaration. In the meantime, we ask the partnership to 
co-ordinate the international monitoring of the Indicators of Progress included in Section III; to refine targets as 
necessary; to provide appropriate guidance to establish baselines; and to enable consistent aggregation of 
information across a range of countries to be summed up in a periodic report. We will also use existing peer 
review mechanisms and regional reviews to support progress in this agenda. We will, in addition, explore 
independent cross-country monitoring and evaluation processes – which should be applied without imposing 
additional burdens on partners – to provide a more comprehensive understanding of how increased aid 
effectiveness contributes to meeting development objectives.  
12. Consistent with the focus on implementation, we plan to meet again in 2008 in a developing country 
and conduct two rounds of monitoring before then to review progress in implementing this Declaration.  
I I .  P a r t n e r s h i p  C o m m i t m e n t s  
13. Developed in a spirit of mutual accountability, these Partnership Commitments are based on the 
lessons of experience. We recognise that commitments need to be interpreted in the light of the specific situation 
of each partner country. 
OWNERSHIP 
Partner countries exercise effective leadership over their development 
policies, and strategies and co-ordinate development actions 
 
14. Partner countries commit to: 
 Exercise leadership in developing and implementing their national development strategies2 through 
broad consultative processes. 
 Translate these national development strategies into prioritised results-oriented operational programmes 
as expressed in medium-term expenditure frameworks and annual budgets (Indicator 1). 
 Take the lead in co-ordinating aid at all levels in conjunction with other development resources in 
dialogue with donors and encouraging the participation of civil society and the private sector. 
15. Donors commit to: 
 Respect partner country leadership and help strengthen their capacity to exercise it. 
                                                     
2 The term `national development strategies’ includes poverty reduction and similar overarching strategies as well 
as sector and thematic strategies. 
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ALIGNMENT 
Donors base their overall support on partner countries’ national 
development strategies, institutions and procedures 
Donors align with partners’ strategies 
16. Donors commit to: 
 Base their overall support — country strategies, policy dialogues and development co-operation 
programmes — on partners’ national development strategies and periodic reviews of progress in 
implementing these strategies3 (Indicator 3).  
 Draw conditions, whenever possible, from a partner’s national development strategy or its annual review 
of progress in implementing this strategy. Other conditions would be included only when a sound 
justification exists and would be undertaken transparently and in close consultation with other donors 
and stakeholders. 
 Link funding to a single framework of conditions and/or a manageable set of indicators derived from 
the national development strategy. This does not mean that all donors have identical conditions, but that 
each donor’s conditions should be derived from a common streamlined framework aimed at achieving 
lasting results. 
Donors use strengthened country systems 
17. Using a country’s own institutions and systems, where these provide assurance that aid will be used for 
agreed purposes, increases aid effectiveness by strengthening the partner country’s sustainable capacity to 
develop, implement and account for its policies to its citizens and parliament. Country systems and procedures 
typically include, but are not restricted to, national arrangements and procedures for public financial 
management, accounting, auditing, procurement, results frameworks and monitoring. 
18. Diagnostic reviews are an important — and growing — source of information to governments and 
donors on the state of country systems in partner countries. Partner countries and donors have a shared interest 
in being able to monitor progress over time in improving country systems. They are assisted by performance 
assessment frameworks, and an associated set of reform measures, that build on the information set out in 
diagnostic reviews and related analytical work. 
19. Partner countries and donors jointly commit to: 
 Work together to establish mutually agreed frameworks that provide reliable assessments of 
performance, transparency and accountability of country systems (Indicator 2). 
 Integrate diagnostic reviews and performance assessment frameworks within country-led strategies for 
capacity development. 
20. Partner countries commit to: 
 Carry out diagnostic reviews that provide reliable assessments of country systems and procedures.  
 On the basis of such diagnostic reviews, undertake reforms that may be necessary to ensure that national 
systems, institutions and procedures for managing aid and other development resources are effective, 
accountable and transparent. 
 Undertake reforms, such as public management reform, that may be necessary to launch and fuel 
sustainable capacity development processes. 
21. Donors commit to: 
 Use country systems and procedures to the maximum extent possible. Where use of country systems is 
not feasible, establish additional safeguards and measures in ways that strengthen rather than undermine 
country systems and procedures (Indicator 5). 
                                                     
3 This includes for example the Annual Progress Review of the Poverty Reduction Strategies (APR). 
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 Avoid, to the maximum extent possible, creating dedicated structures for day-to-day management and 
implementation of aid-financed projects and programmes (Indicator 6). 
 Adopt harmonised performance assessment frameworks for country systems so as to avoid presenting 
partner countries with an excessive number of potentially conflicting targets.  
Partner countries strengthen development capacity with support from donors 
22. The capacity to plan, manage, implement, and account for results of policies and programmes, is 
critical for achieving development objectives — from analysis and dialogue through implementation, monitoring 
and evaluation. Capacity development is the responsibility of partner countries with donors playing a support 
role. It needs not only to be based on sound technical analysis, but also to be responsive to the broader social, 
political and economic environment, including the need to strengthen human resources. 
23. Partner countries commit to: 
 Integrate specific capacity strengthening objectives in national development strategies and pursue their 
implementation through country-led capacity development strategies where needed. 
24. Donors commit to: 
 Align their analytic and financial support with partners’ capacity development objectives and strategies, 
make effective use of existing capacities and harmonise support for capacity development accordingly 
(Indicator 4). 
Strengthen public financial management capacity 
25. Partner countries commit to: 
 Intensify efforts to mobilise domestic resources, strengthen fiscal sustainability, and create an enabling 
environment for public and private investments. 
 Publish timely, transparent and reliable reporting on budget execution. 
 Take leadership of the public financial management reform process. 
26. Donors commit to: 
 Provide reliable indicative commitments of aid over a multi-year framework and disburse aid in a timely 
and predictable fashion according to agreed schedules (Indicator 7). 
 Rely to the maximum extent possible on transparent partner government budget and accounting 
mechanisms (Indicator 5).  
27. Partner countries and donors jointly commit to: 
 Implement harmonised diagnostic reviews and performance assessment frameworks in public financial 
management. 
Strengthen national procurement systems 
28. Partner countries and donors jointly commit to: 
 Use mutually agreed standards and processes4 to carry out diagnostics, develop sustainable reforms and 
monitor implementation. 
 Commit sufficient resources to support and sustain medium and long-term procurement reforms and 
capacity development. 
 Share feedback at the country level on recommended approaches so they can be improved over time. 
                                                     
4  Such as the processes developed by the joint OECD-DAC – World Bank Round Table on Strengthening 
Procurement Capacities in Developing Countries. 
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29. Partner countries commit to take leadership and implement the procurement reform process. 
30. Donors commit to: 
 Progressively rely on partner country systems for procurement when the country has implemented 
mutually agreed standards and processes (Indicator 5). 
 Adopt harmonised approaches when national systems do not meet mutually agreed levels of 
performance or donors do not use them. 
Untie aid: getting better value for money 
31. Untying aid generally increases aid effectiveness by reducing transaction costs for partner countries and 
improving country ownership and alignment. DAC Donors will continue to make progress on untying as 
encouraged by the 2001 DAC Recommendation on Untying Official Development Assistance to the Least 
Developed Countries (Indicator 8). 
HARMONISATION 
Donors’ actions are more harmonised, transparent and collectively effective 
Donors implement common arrangements and simplify procedures 
32. Donors commit to: 
 Implement the donor action plans that they have developed as part of the follow-up to the Rome High-
Level Forum. 
 Implement, where feasible, common arrangements at country level for planning, funding (e.g. joint 
financial arrangements), disbursement, monitoring, evaluating and reporting to government on donor 
activities and aid flows. Increased use of programme-based aid modalities can contribute to this effort 
(Indicator 9). 
 Work together to reduce the number of separate, duplicative, missions to the field and diagnostic 
reviews (Indicator 10); and promote joint training to share lessons learnt and build a community of 
practice. 
Complementarity: more effective division of labour 
33. Excessive fragmentation of aid at global, country or sector level impairs aid effectiveness. A pragmatic 
approach to the division of labour and burden sharing increases complementarity and can reduce transaction 
costs. 
34. Partner countries commit to: 
 Provide clear views on donors’ comparative advantage and on how to achieve donor complementarity at 
country or sector level. 
35. Donors commit to: 
 Make full use of their respective comparative advantage at sector or country level by delegating, where 
appropriate, authority to lead donors for the execution of programmes, activities and tasks. 
 Work together to harmonise separate procedures. 
Incentives for collaborative behaviour 
36. Donors and partner countries jointly commit to: 
 Reform procedures and strengthen incentives—including for recruitment, appraisal and training—for 
management and staff to work towards harmonisation, alignment and results.  
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Delivering effective aid in fragile states5 
37. The long-term vision for international engagement in fragile states is to build legitimate, effective and 
resilient state and other country institutions. While the guiding principles of effective aid apply equally to fragile 
states, they need to be adapted to environments of weak ownership and capacity and to immediate needs for 
basic service delivery. 
38. Partner countries commit to: 
 Make progress towards building institutions and establishing governance structures that deliver effective 
governance, public safety, security, and equitable access to basic social services for their citizens. 
 Engage in dialogue with donors on developing simple planning tools, such as the transitional results 
matrix, where national development strategies are not yet in place. 
 Encourage broad participation of a range of national actors in setting development priorities. 
39. Donors commit to: 
 Harmonise their activities. Harmonisation is all the more crucial in the absence of strong government 
leadership. It should focus on upstream analysis, joint assessments, joint strategies, co-ordination of 
political engagement; and practical initiatives such as the establishment of joint donor offices. 
 Align to the maximum extent possible behind central government-led strategies or, if that is not 
possible, donors should make maximum use of country, regional, sector or non-government systems.  
 Avoid activities that undermine national institution building, such as bypassing national budget processes 
or setting high salaries for local staff.  
 Use an appropriate mix of aid instruments, including support for recurrent financing, particularly for 
countries in promising but high-risk transitions. 
Promoting a harmonised approach to environmental assessments 
40. Donors have achieved considerable progress in harmonisation around environmental impact 
assessment (EIA) including relevant health and social issues at the project level. This progress needs to be 
deepened, including on addressing implications of global environmental issues such as climate change, 
desertification and loss of biodiversity. 
41. Donors and partner countries jointly commit to: 
 Strengthen the application of EIAs and deepen common procedures for projects, including 
consultations with stakeholders; and develop and apply common approaches for “strategic 
environmental assessment” at the sector and national levels. 
 Continue to develop the specialised technical and policy capacity necessary for environmental analysis 
and for enforcement of legislation. 
42. Similar harmonisation efforts are also needed on other cross-cutting issues, such as gender equality and 
other thematic issues including those financed by dedicated funds. 
MANAGING FOR RESULTS 
Managing resources and improving decision-making for results 
43. Managing for results means managing and implementing aid in a way that focuses on the desired 
results and uses information to improve decision-making. 
                                                     
5 The following section draws on the draft Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States, which 
emerged from the Senior Level Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States (London, January 2005). 
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44. Partner countries commit to: 
 Strengthen the linkages between national development strategies and annual and multi-annual budget 
processes. 
 Endeavour to establish results-oriented reporting and assessment frameworks that monitor progress 
against key dimensions of the national and sector development strategies; and that these frameworks 
should track a manageable number of indicators for which data are cost-effectively available 
(Indicator 11). 
45. Donors commit to: 
 Link country programming and resources to results and align them with effective partner country 
performance assessment frameworks, refraining from requesting the introduction of performance 
indicators that are not consistent with partners’ national development strategies. 
 Work with partner countries to rely, as far as possible, on partner countries’ results-oriented reporting 
and monitoring frameworks. 
 Harmonise their monitoring and reporting requirements, and, until they can rely more extensively on 
partner countries’ statistical, monitoring and evaluation systems, with partner countries to the maximum 
extent possible on joint formats for periodic reporting. 
46. Partner countries and donors jointly commit to: 
 Work together in a participatory approach to strengthen country capacities and demand for results based 
management. 
MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
Donors and partners are accountable for development results 
47. A major priority for partner countries and donors is to enhance mutual accountability and transparency 
in the use of development resources. This also helps strengthen public support for national policies and 
development assistance.  
48. Partner countries commit to: 
 Strengthen as appropriate the parliamentary role in national development strategies and/or budgets. 
 Reinforce participatory approaches by systematically involving a broad range of development partners 
when formulating and assessing progress in implementing national development strategies. 
49. Donors commit to: 
 Provide timely, transparent and comprehensive information on aid flows so as to enable partner 
authorities to present comprehensive budget reports to their legislatures and citizens. 
50. Partner countries and donors commit to: 
 Jointly assess through existing and increasingly objective country level mechanisms mutual progress in 
implementing agreed commitments on aid effectiveness, including the Partnership Commitments. 
(Indicator 12). 
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I I I .  I n d i c a t o r s  o f  P r o g r e s s  
To be measured nationally and monitored internationally 
O W N E R S H I P  T A R G E T  F O R  2 0 1 0  
1 
Partners have operational development strategies —
 Number of countries with national development strategies 
(including PRSs) that have clear strategic priorities linked 
to a medium-term expenditure framework and reflected in 
annual budgets. 
At least 75% of partner countries have operational 
development strategies. 
A L I G N M E N T  T A R G E T S  F O R  2 0 1 0  
(a) Public financial management – Half of partner 
countries move up at least one measure (i.e., 0.5 points) on the 
PFM/ CPIA (Country Policy and Institutional Assessment) scale of 
performance. 2 
Reliable country systems — Number of partner countries 
that have procurement and public financial management 
systems that either (a) adhere to broadly accepted good 
practices or (b) have a reform programme in place to 
achieve these. 
(b) Procurement – One-third of partner countries move up 
at least one measure (i.e., from D to C, C to B or B to A) on the 
four-point scale used to assess performance for this indicator. 
3 
Aid flows are aligned on national priorities — Percent of 
aid flows to the government sector that is reported on 
partners’ national budgets. 
Halve the gap — halve the proportion of aid flows to government 
sector not reported on government’s budget(s) (with at least 85% 
reported on budget). 
4 
Strengthen capacity by co-ordinated support — Percent of 
donor capacity-development support provided through co-
ordinated programmes consistent with partners’ national 
development strategies. 
50% of technical co-operation flows are implemented 
through co-ordinated programmes consistent with national 
development strategies.  
P E R C E N T  O F  D O N O R S  
Score* Target 
5+ All donors use partner countries’ PFM systems. 
3.5 to 4.5 90% of donors use partner countries’ PFM systems. 
P E R C E N T  O F  A I D  F L O W S  
Score* Target 
5+ A two-thirds reduction in the % of aid to the public sector not using partner countries’ PFM systems. 
5a 
Use of country public financial management systems —
Percent of donors and of aid flows that use public financial 
management systems in partner countries, which either 
(a) adhere to broadly accepted good practices or (b) have 
a reform programme in place to achieve these. 
3.5 to 4.5 A one-third reduction in the % of aid to the public sector not using partner countries’ PFM systems. 
P E R C E N T  O F  D O N O R S  
Score* Target 
A All donors use partner countries’ procurement systems. 
B 90% of donors use partner countries’ procurement systems. 
P E R C E N T  O F  A I D  F L O W S  
Score* Target 
A 
A two-thirds reduction in the % of aid to the public 
sector not using partner countries’ procurement 
systems. 
5b 
Use of country procurement systems — Percent of donors 
and of aid flows that use partner country procurement 
systems which either (a) adhere to broadly accepted good 
practices or (b) have a reform programme in place to 
achieve these. 
B 
A one-third reduction in the % of aid to the public 
sector not using partner countries’ procurement 
systems. 
6 
Strengthen capacity by avoiding parallel implementation 
structures — Number of parallel project implementation 
units (PIUs) per country. 
Reduce by two-thirds the stock of parallel project 
implementation units (PIUs). 
7 
Aid is more predictable — Percent of aid disbursements 
released according to agreed schedules in annual or multi-
year frameworks. 
Halve the gap — halve the proportion of aid not disbursed within 
the fiscal year for which it was scheduled. 
8 Aid is untied — Percent of bilateral aid that is untied. Continued progress over time. 
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H A R M O N I S A T I O N  T A R G E T S  F O R  2 0 1 0  
9 Use of common arrangements or procedures — Percent of aid provided as programme-based approaches.  
66% of aid flows are provided in the context of programme-
based approaches. 
(a) 40% of donor missions to the field are joint. 
10 
Encourage shared analysis — Percent of (a) field missions 
and/or (b) country analytic work, including diagnostic 
reviews that are joint. (b) 66% of country analytic work is joint. 
M A N A G I N G  F O R  R E S U L T S  T A R G E T  F O R  2 0 1 0  
11 
Results-oriented frameworks — Number of countries with 
transparent and monitorable performance assessment 
frameworks to assess progress against (a) the national 
development strategies and (b) sector programmes. 
Reduce the gap by one-third — Reduce the proportion of 
countries without transparent and monitorable performance 
assessment frameworks by one-third. 
M U T U A L  A C C O U N T A B I L I T Y  T A R G E T  F O R  2 0 1 0  
12 
Mutual accountability — Number of partner countries that 
undertake mutual assessments of progress in 
implementing agreed commitments on aid effectiveness 
including those in this Declaration. 
All partner countries have mutual assessment reviews in place. 
 
Important Note: In accordance with paragraph 9 of the Declaration, the partnership of donors and partner countries hosted by 
the DAC (Working Party on Aid Effectiveness) comprising OECD/DAC members, partner countries and multilateral institutions, met 
twice, on 30-31 May 2005 and on 7-8 July 2005 to adopt, and review where appropriate, the targets for the twelve Indicators of 
Progress. At these meetings an agreement was reached on the targets presented under Section III of the present Declaration. This 
agreement is subject to reservations by one donor on (a) the methodology for assessing the quality of locally-managed procurement 
systems (relating to targets 2b and 5b) and (b) the acceptable quality of public financial management reform programmes (relating 
to target 5a.ii). Further discussions are underway to address these issues. The targets, including the reservation, have been notified 
to the Chairs of the High-level Plenary Meeting of the 59th General Assembly of the United Nations in a letter of 9 September 2005 
by Mr. Richard Manning, Chair of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). 
*Note on Indicator 5: Scores for Indicator 5 are determined by the methodology used to measure quality of procurement and 
public financial management systems under Indicator 2 above. 
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A p p e n d i x  A :  
Methodological Notes on the Indicators of Progress 
The Indicators of Progress provides a framework in which to make operational the responsibilities and accountabilities 
that are framed in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. This framework draws selectively from the Partnership 
Commitments presented in Section II of this Declaration. 
Purpose — The Indicators of Progress provide a framework in which to make operational the responsibilities and 
accountabilities that are framed in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. They measure principally collective 
behaviour at the country level. 
Country level vs. global level — The indicators are to be measured at the country level in close collaboration 
between partner countries and donors. Values of country level indicators can then be statistically aggregated at the 
regional or global level. This global aggregation would be done both for the country panel mentioned below, for 
purposes of statistical comparability, and more broadly for all partner countries for which relevant data are available. 
Donor / Partner country performance — The indicators of progress also provide a benchmark against which 
individual donor agencies or partner countries can measure their performance at the country, regional, or 
global level. In measuring individual donor performance, the indicators should be applied with flexibility in the 
recognition that donors have different institutional mandates.  
Targets — The targets are set at the global level. Progress against these targets is to be measured by aggregating data 
measured at the country level. In addition to global targets, partner countries and donors in a given country might agree 
on country-level targets. 
Baseline — A baseline will be established for 2005 in a panel of self-selected countries. The partnership of donors and 
partner countries hosted by the DAC (Working Party on Aid Effectiveness) is asked to establish this panel. 
Definitions and criteria — The partnership of donors and partner countries hosted by the DAC (Working Party on Aid 
Effectiveness) is asked to provide specific guidance on definitions, scope of application, criteria and methodologies to 
assure that results can be aggregated across countries and across time. 
Note on Indicator 9 — Programme based approaches are defined in Volume 2 of Harmonising Donor Practices for 
Effective Aid Delivery (OECD, 2005) in Box 3.1 as a way of engaging in development cooperation based on the principles 
of co-ordinated support for a locally owned programme of development, such as a national development strategy, a 
sector programme, a thematic programme or a programme of a specific organisation. Programme based approaches 
share the following features: (a) leadership by the host country or organisation; (b) a single comprehensive programme 
and budget framework; (c) a formalised process for donor co-ordination and harmonisation of donor procedures for 
reporting, budgeting, financial management and procurement; (d) Efforts to increase the use of local systems for 
programme design and implementation, financial management, monitoring and evaluation. For the purpose of 
indicator 9 performance will be measured separately across the aid modalities that contribute to programme-based 
approaches. 
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A P P E N D I X  B :  
List of Participating Countries and Organisations 
Participating Countries 
Albania Australia Austria  
Bangladesh Belgium Benin 
Bolivia Botswana [Brazil]* 
Burkina Faso Burundi Cambodia 
Cameroon Canada China 
Congo D.R. Czech Republic Denmark 
Dominican Republic Egypt Ethiopia 
European Commission Fiji Finland 
France Gambia, The Germany 
Ghana Greece Guatemala 
Guinea Honduras Iceland 
Indonesia Ireland Italy 
Jamaica Japan Jordan 
Kenya Korea Kuwait 
Kyrgyz Republic Lao PDR Luxembourg 
Madagascar Malawi Malaysia 
Mali Mauritania Mexico 
Mongolia Morocco Mozambique 
Nepal Netherlands New Zealand 
Nicaragua Niger Norway 
Pakistan Papua New Guinea Philippines 
Poland Portugal Romania 
Russian Federation Rwanda Saudi Arabia 
Senegal Serbia and Montenegro Slovak Republic 
Solomon Islands South Africa Spain 
Sri Lanka Sweden Switzerland 
Tajikistan Tanzania Thailand 
Timor-Leste Tunisia Turkey 
Uganda United Kingdom United States of America 
Vanuatu Vietnam Yemen 
Zambia   
* To be  conf irmed.  
More countries than listed here have endorsed the Paris Declaration. For a full and up to date list please consult 
www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclaration/members. 
Participating Organisations 
African Development Bank Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa 
Asian Development Bank Commonwealth Secretariat 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP) Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB) 
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) Education for All Fast Track Initiative (EFA-FTI) 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) European Investment Bank (EIB) 
Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria G24 
Inter-American Development Bank International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) International Organisation of the Francophonie 
Islamic Development Bank Millennium Campaign 
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) Nordic Development Fund 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) 
OPEC Fund for International Development Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat 
United Nations Development Group (UNDG) World Bank 
Civil Society Organisations 
Africa Humanitarian Action AFRODAD 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundations Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC) 
Comité Catholique contre la Faim et pour le Développement 
(CCFD) 
Coopération Internationale pour le Développement et la Solidarité 
(CIDSE) 
Comisión Económica (Nicaragua) ENDA Tiers Monde 
EURODAD International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources (IUCN) 
Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC) Reality of Aid Network 
Tanzania Social and Economic Trust (TASOET) UK Aid Network 
 
 Publications of the German Development Institute 
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 
Neubert, Susanne / Waltina Scheumann / Annette van Edig / Walter Huppert (eds): 
Integriertes Wasserressourcen-Management (IWRM): Ein Konzept in die Pra-
xis überführen, 314 p., Nomos, Baden-Baden 2004, ISBN 3-8329-1111-1 
Messner, Dirk / Imme Scholz (eds): Zukunftsfragen der Entwicklungspolitik, 410 p. , 
Nomos, Baden-Baden 2004, ISBN 3-8329-1005-0 
Brandt, Hartmut / Uwe Otzen: Armutsorientierte landwirtschaftliche und ländliche 
Entwicklung, 342 p., Nomos, Baden-Baden 2004, ISBN 3-8329-0555-3 
Liebig, Klaus: Internationale Regulierung geistiger Eigentumsrechte und Wissenser-
werb in Entwicklungsländern: Eine ökonomische Analyse, 233 p., Nomos,   
Baden-Baden 2007, ISBN 978-3-8329-2379-2 (Entwicklungstheorie und Ent-
wicklungspolitik 1) 
Schlumberger, Oliver: Autoritarismus in der arabischen Welt: Ursachen, Trends und 
internationale Demokratieförderung, 255 p., Nomos, Baden-Baden 2008, ISBN 
978-3-8329-3114-8 (Entwicklungstheorie und Entwicklungspolitik 2) 
Qualmann, Regine: South Africa’s Reintegration into World and Regional Markets: 
Trade Liberalization and Emerging Patterns of Specialization in the Post-
Apartheid Era, 206 p., Nomos, Baden-Baden 2008, ISBN 978-3-8329-2995-4 
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[Books may be ordered only through publishing house or bookshops.] 
Schriftenreihe bei Routledge 
Brandt, Hartmut and Uwe Otzen: Poverty Orientated Agricultural and Rural Develop-
ment, 342 p., Routledge, London 2007, ISBN 978-0-415-36853-7 (Studies in 
Development and Society 12) 
[Books may be ordered only through publishing house or bookshops.] 
Berichte und Gutachten 
[Price: 9,63 Euro; books may be ordered directly from the DIE or through book-
shops. This publication series was terminated and superseded by the new publica-
tion series “Studies”, starting November 2004.] 
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A Study on Wasta in Jordan, 216 p., Bonn 2007, ISBN 978-3-88985-358-5  
29 Grävingholt, Jörn / Claudia Hofmann / Stephan Klingebiel: Development 
Cooperation and Non-State Armed Groups, 112 p., Bonn 2007, ISBN 978-
3-88985-353-0 (German edition: ISBN 978-3-88985-333-2 – Studies 24) 
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